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Size Matters: Commercial Banks
and the Capital Markets
CHARLES K. WHITEHEAD*
The conventional story is that the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act broke
down the Glass–Steagall Act’s wall separating commercial and
investment banking in 1999, increasing risky business activities by
commercial banks and precipitating the 2007 financial crisis. But the
conventional story is only one-half complete. What it omits is the effect
of change in commercial bank regulation on financial firms other than
the commercial banks. After all, it was the failure of Lehman
Brothers—an investment bank, not a commercial bank—that sparked
the meltdown.
This Article provides the rest of the story. The basic premise is
straightforward: By 1999, the Glass–Steagall Act’s original purpose—
to protect commercial banks from the capital markets—had reversed.
Instead, its main function had become protecting the capital markets
from new competition by commercial banks. Once the wall came
down, commercial banks gained a sizeable share of the investment
banking business. To offset lost revenues, investment banks pursued
riskier businesses, growing their principal investments and increasing
the amounts they borrowed to finance them. In effect, they assumed
the features of commercial banks—a reliance on short-term borrowing
to finance longer-term (and riskier) investments. For the investment
banks, combining the two was lethal and eventually triggered the
financial meltdown.
The divide between two sets of regulators, those regulating
commercial banks and those regulating investment banks, enabled the
change. The need for greater regulatory coordination has grown with
convergence in the financial markets. Although new regulation has
addressed some of the concern, the gap between regulators continues
today—raising the risk of repeating mistakes from the past.
Acknowledging the role of bank regulation (and deregulation) in
reshaping the capital markets is a key step in the right direction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, the Glass–Steagall Act1 erected a wall between commercial
and investment banks,2 largely by restricting a commercial bank’s (or its
affiliate’s) ability to underwrite, trade, and sell securities.3 The separation was
intended as a shield: To protect commercial banks and their depositors against
risks that would arise if a bank or bank affiliate began to do business in the
capital markets.4 It was no surprise, then, that when the Gramm–Leach–Bliley
1 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in

scattered sections of 12, 15 and 39 U.S.C.).
2 This Article’s focus is on the relationship between investment banks and the largest
commercial banks. References to “banks” or “commercial banks” are to the largest U.S.
deposit-taking institutions, including the U.S. operations of non-U.S. institutions.
References to “investment banks” are to broker-dealers whose core business has
traditionally been securities underwriting, securities trading (as principal and for
customers), investment advice, and strategic (mergers and acquisitions) advice.
3 See Banking Act § 16, 48 Stat. at 184–85 (restricting underwriting and proprietary
trading by banks) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012)); id. § 20, 48 Stat. at 188–89
(restricting affiliation) (repealed 1999); id. § 21, 48 Stat. at 189 (prohibiting deposit-taking
by investment banks) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 378 (2012)); see also id. § 32, 48 Stat.
at 194 (prohibiting common management) (repealed 1999).
4 See Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems: Hearing on
S. Res. 71 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 71st Cong. 480
(1931) (statement of W. Z. Ripley, Professor, Harvard University) (noting conflicts of
interest in trading that resulted from having a commercial bank and investment bank as
affiliates); id. at 1063–64 (summarizing responses to a subcommittee questionnaire relating
to conflicts); S. REP. NO. 73-77, at 6–8 (1933) (blaming loose bank credit policies for
fueling speculative investment and inflating securities prices); see also Bd. of Governors of
Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Inv. Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 61 (1981) (“Congress was persuaded that
speculative activities, partially attributable to the connection between commercial banking
and investment banking, had contributed to the rash of bank failures.”); Inv. Co. Inst. v.
Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630 (1971) (noting that “[t]he Glass–Steagall Act reflected a
determination that policies of competition, convenience, or expertise which might
otherwise support the entry of commercial banks into the investment banking business
were outweighed by the ‘hazards’ and ‘financial dangers’ that arise when commercial
banks engage in” investment banking). That purpose has been echoed in scholarship
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Act5 took down the final bricks in the wall in 1999,6 the principal concern was
whether commercial banks would increase financial risk-taking7 and, later,
regarding the Glass–Steagall Act. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., International
Alignment of Financial Sector Regulation, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY 365, 368
(Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009) [hereinafter RESTORING] (“The
investment banking activities were . . . deemed too risky to be put under the same
functional umbrella as a commercial bank . . . .”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 S.
CAL. L. REV. 69, 98 (2013) (“By legally isolating deposit-taking banks from liabilities
associated with riskier banking activities, the Glass–Steagall Act helped to safeguard
deposits.”); see also Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd–Frank Act Restrictions on
Proprietary Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 517 (2011) (“[I]mposing restrictions on bank activities was
thought to be essential because commercial bank participation in investment banking and
securities trading was deemed a major cause of the financial collapse.”); cf. GEORGE J.
BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANKING 13–14 (1990)
(listing reasons for the Glass–Steagall Act, including protecting the commercial banks but
also the interest of the securities industry in “bar[ring] those banks that would offer
securities and underwriting services from entering their markets,” as well as the
commercial banks’ competitive advantage that could result in their “domination or
takeover” of the investment banks). But see Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting PublicRegarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 223, 237 (1986) (arguing that the Glass–Steagall Act reflected lobbying by
investment banks interested in limiting commercial bank competition, although “one
cannot reach this conclusion by examining either the statute itself or its legislative history”
(footnote omitted)).
5 Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338,
1341 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). The Gramm–Leach–
Bliley Act brought down the wall between commercial and investment banks principally
by permitting those businesses, housed in separate entities, to have a common parent. See
e.g., RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 69 (5th ed.
2013) (“The Glass–Steagall Act, once likened to a high stone wall, had become more akin
to a screen door.”). Thus, direct securities activities by commercial banks—the
underwriting of most securities and trading in equities and certain debt securities for their
own account—continue to be restricted, although the Glass–Steagall Act was amended to
permit certain well-capitalized banks to underwrite, deal, and purchase municipal revenue
bonds. See Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act § 151 (amending Glass–Steagall Act § 16, 12 U.S.C.
§ 24 (2012)). Similarly, securities affiliates and unaffiliated securities firms that are
“engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing . . . stocks, bonds,
debentures, notes, or other securities” may not accept deposits. 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1)
(2012). Thus, national banks and state member banks may not underwrite most types of
securities, including through a separate non-bank affiliate or subsidiary, and securities
underwriters may not take deposits. See id.
6 The wall eroded prior to passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, partly in
response to change in the financial markets that weakened the banks’ competitive position
and caused them to pursue new businesses. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of
Banking: Before and After Gramm–Leach–Bliley, 25 J. CORP. L. 691, 691–92 (2000)
(“[O]ver time, banks and investment banks had conspired with compliant regulators to
punch giant holes in the statutory restrictions on combining commercial banking and
investment banking. In other words, the Glass–Steagall Act was already a dead letter when
Gramm–Leach–Bliley was passed.”).
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whether that risk-taking precipitated the 2007 financial crisis.8 No doubt, the
banks’ (and their affiliates’) ability to enter the capital markets changed the
nature and extent of the risks they incurred,9 and greater risk-taking
contributed to losses that arose during the financial crisis.10 What the
conventional story omits, however, is the effect of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley
Act on financial firms other than commercial banks. That failure has resulted
in a gap in our understanding of what led to the financial crisis. After all, it
was Lehman Brothers—an investment bank, not a commercial bank—that

7 See, e.g., Kevin J. Stiroh & Adrienne Rumble, The Dark Side of Diversification:
The Case of US Financial Holding Companies, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 2131, 2133–34
(2006) (reporting that, for financial holding companies dependent on high volatility
revenues, the benefits of diversification from the weak correlation across different income
sources were more than offset by the risks); Michelle Heller, ’03 Regulatory Outlook
Suddenly Unsettled, AM. BANKER, Nov. 11, 2002, at 1 (“Sen. Shelby [senior member of the
Senate Banking Committee] . . . said he was considering [committee] hearings as a way to
determine whether mixing the [commercial and investment banking] businesses was
jeopardizing the safety and soundness of the banking system.”).
8 See, e.g., LAWRENCE G. MCDONALD & PATRICK ROBINSON, A COLOSSAL FAILURE
OF COMMON SENSE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHERS 7 (2009)
(stating that the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act was “directly responsible for bringing the entire
world to the brink of financial ruin”); Julie A.D. Manasfi, Systemic Risk and Dodd–Frank’s
Volcker Rule, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 181, 182 (2013) (“[T]his Article asks the
important question of whether the blending of commercial banking and investment banking
produces the alleged harm: increased systemic risk.”).
9 See, e.g., Anthony Saunders et al., Enhanced Regulation of Large, Complex
Financial Institutions, in RESTORING, supra note 4, at 139–40, 143 (noting that competition
for investment bank mandates was “increasingly aggressive . . . greatly increasing the risk
exposures that banks were willing to take on their own books” and that, like investment
banks, “the banks increasingly relied on proprietary trading revenues as competitive
pressure eroded intermediation margins”); Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., How Should We
Respond to the Growing Risks of Financial Conglomerates?, in FINANCIAL
MODERNIZATION AFTER GRAMM–LEACH–BLILEY 65, 77 (Patricia A. McCoy ed., 2002)
(“[The Gramm–Leach–Bliley] Act will promote a greater consolidation of risk within the
financial sector, because it has removed the structural separations that (i) previously
shielded commercial and investment banks from problems occurring in the other sector,
and (ii) enabled each sector to serve as an independent source of financing during financial
disruptions.”).
10 See, e.g., Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Is the 2007 US Sub-Prime
Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison, 98 AM. ECON.
REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 339, 340 (2008) (“The impact of [sub-prime] defaults on the
financial sector has been greatly magnified due to the complex bundling of obligations that
was thought to spread risk efficiently.”); Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 71 (noting that the
growth, over the preceding two decades, of aggressive syndicated lending and
securitization, as well as speculative underwriting and investment activities, “have made
large financial institutions vulnerable to serious losses during disruptions in the capital
markets”).
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sparked the meltdown leading to the crisis.11 And, not having learned from our
mistakes, we risk repeating them.12
This Article provides the rest of the story—a facet of bank regulatory
reform and its effect on the capital markets that legal scholarship has largely
overlooked. The basic premise is straightforward: By the time the Gramm–
Leach–Bliley Act passed in 1999, the Glass–Steagall Act’s principal original
purpose—to protect commercial banks from the capital markets—had
reversed. Instead, its main function had become protecting the capital markets
from new competition by the commercial banks.
Once the Glass–Steagall Act’s wall came down, commercial banks gained
a sizeable share of business in the capital markets, displacing the role of
investment banks. The size of a bank’s balance sheet—its ability to extend
credit through traditional lending—became a decisive factor for borrowers in
determining who would win capital markets mandates.13 Commercial banks
offered a package of products and services that competed with those
traditionally provided by investment banks.14 To offset lost revenues,
investment banks grew their principal investments15 and the amounts they
borrowed to finance them.16 In effect, as commercial banks entered the
investment banking business, investment banks began to assume the features
of commercial banks—in particular, a reliance on short-term borrowing in
order to finance longer-term (and riskier) investments.17 For investment banks,
combining the two—greater risk-taking and leverage—was lethal18 and
eventually triggered the financial meltdown.19
11 See, e.g., Peter Thal Larsen, Collapse of the House of Lehman Was Trigger Point,

FIN. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2008, at 6 (“The starting point for the most recent meltdown was the
decision by the US authorities to allow Lehman Brothers to fail. . . . At the time, some
observers saw the Lehman bankruptcy as a cathartic moment. In fact, it was the trigger for
a wave of failures and near-failures of banking institutions across the developed world.”).
Interestingly, when assessing the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, its immediate effect on the
investment banks—such as Lehman Brothers’ failure—is sometimes held out as evidence
that repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act had limited impact on financial market instability
because commercial banks were not directly affected. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin,
Reinstating an Old Rule Is Not a Cure for Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2012),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/21/reinstating-an-old-rule-is-not-a-cure-for-crisis/
[http://perma.cc/ZQ32-5TQ6]. What that analysis fails to consider is the impact of the
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act on the capital markets and, in turn, the impact of investment
bank failures on commercial banks.
12 See infra notes 246–56 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 59–67 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 69–75 and accompanying text.
15 See infra Figures 1 & 2, notes 93–125 and accompanying text.
16 See infra Figure 3, notes 131–41 and accompanying text.
17 This mismatch between assets and liabilities is a standard feature of commercial
banks. See infra notes 49, 189 and accompanying text.
18 See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL
THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY 17 (2010) (“[T]he central cause for the financial panic
was not so much that the banks packaged and distributed low-quality subprime mortgage-
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To illustrate, consider what occurred around Lucent Technologies’
decision to spin-off its optical network subsidiary, Agere Systems, in 2001.
Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB), both investment
banks, were originally tapped to lead Agere’s initial public offering (IPO)
before Lucent found itself in need of $6.5 billion in short-term credit.20 In
order to procure the additional funding, JPMorgan and Citigroup, two
commercial banks, each committed $1.25 billion to Lucent and arranged for
others to make up the shortfall.21 Goldman Sachs and CSFB declined to join
the lending group and were dropped as co-managers of the IPO,22 positions
that were picked up by the investment bank affiliates of Lucent’s new
principal creditors, JPMorgan and Citigroup.23
Morgan Stanley was also a co-lead manager of the Agere IPO.24 To be
selected, Morgan Stanley agreed to purchase up to $2.6 billion in Lucent
debt,25 a portion of which it exchanged with Lucent for up to 90 million Agere
shares.26 For Morgan Stanley, the risks were significant. Prior to the IPO,
Lucent’s credit rating dropped to one notch above “junk” (below investmentgrade) status.27 When the deal became public, Morgan Stanley’s stock price
plummeted by over twenty percent,28 principally due to concerns over the risk
Morgan Stanley had assumed—the possibility of Lucent’s credit rating
dropping further or the value of the Agere shares being less than the Lucent
backed securities but that they held on to substantial quantities themselves, either on or off
their balance sheets, financing these holdings with short-term debt.”); Viral Acharya et al.,
The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009: Causes and Remedies, 18 FIN. MKTS. INSTITUTIONS &
INSTRUMENTS 89, 108 (2009) (“Whatever the reasons, and they may have differed across
firms, we believe that the combination of leverage and the fact that financial firms chose
not to transfer the credit risk (even though they pretended to do so) is the root cause of the
financial crisis.”).
19 See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, THE END OF WALL STREET 287 (2010) (“Rampant
speculation (and abuse) in mortgages was surely the primary cause of the bubble, which
was greatly inflated by leverage in the banking system, in particular on Wall Street.”).
20 See Justin Schack, The New Battle for the Bulge, INSTITUTIONAL INV., Aug. 2001,
at 35, 37; Randall Smith, Lucent Deal Shows Wall Street Takes on Greater Risk, WALL
STREET J., Feb. 23, 2001, at C1.
21 See Schack, supra note 20, at 37.
22 See id. Goldman Sachs and CSFB may have learned from the Agere IPO. They
later bought $1 billion of AT&T debt as part of their participation in AT&T’s spin-off of
AT&T Wireless Group. See Emily Thornton, Commentary: To Snare IPOs, Wall Street
May Be Risking Too Much, BLOOMBERG (July 8, 2001), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/
stories/2001-07-08/commentary-to-snare-ipos-wall-street-may-be-risking-too-much [http://
perma.cc/9EQR-EBVK].
23 See Agere Sys. Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4), at cover (Mar. 27, 2001); Schack,
supra note 20, at 37.
24 See AGERE, supra note 23, at cover.
25 See Schack, supra note 20, at 37.
26 See AGERE, supra note 23, at 141. The arrangement permitted Lucent to retire a
portion of its debt in a tax-efficient manner. See id.
27 See Smith, supra note 20, at C1.
28 See Thornton, supra note 22.
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debt Morgan Stanley had agreed to exchange.29 In the end, Morgan Stanley
earned roughly $75 million in fees, but only following billions of dollars in
lost market capitalization and at the risk of incurring significant loan-related
losses.30
What the Lucent/Agere financing illustrates is the commercial banks’ use
of their sizeable balance sheets to enter the traditional investment banking
business. Investment banks, in response, assumed greater risk and leverage in
order to remain competitive. To be sure, passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley
Act was not the only reason for the change. Investment banks sought new
ways to make up for the drop in profitability31 caused by a number of factors,
including a general slowdown in the investment banking business32 and the
rise of low-cost online and electronic trading.33 As Part II describes, however,
what makes the effect of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act exceptional was the
divide between two sets of regulators, those regulating commercial banks and
those regulating investment banks, that resulted in a lapse in regulation as the
investment banks changed how they conducted business. Rather than one or
another regulator dropping the ball,34 problems leading up to the financial
crisis arose due to a structure in which siloed regulators, for legitimate reasons,
pursued policy initiatives that spilled over to other parts of the financial
markets.35 As Part III describes, although new federal law has addressed some
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See infra notes 87–91, 115–24 and accompanying text.
32 See, e.g., Patrick McGeehan, Lehman Profit Drops 67%, Hammered by Sept. 11

Disruption, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/21/business/
lehman-profit-drops-67-hammered-by-sept-11-disruption.html [http://perma.cc/6L5H-FMZU];
Landon Thomas Jr., Lower Profits at 2 Big Firms in a Year of Weak Markets, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 20, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/20/business/corporate-conduct-financialresults-lower-profits-2-big-firms-year-weak-markets.html [http://perma.cc/7K5V-398G].
33 See, e.g., The Goldman Sachs Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 20 (Feb. 7, 2006)
[hereinafter Goldman Sachs 2006]; Morgan Stanley, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 46 (Feb.
13, 2006) [hereinafter Morgan Stanley 2006].
34 None of this is to suggest that regulatory oversight could not have been improved.
See, e.g., Theo Francis, SEC’s Cox Catches Blame for Financial Crisis, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2008-09-19/secs-cox-catchesblame-for-financial-crisisbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice
[http://perma.cc/TGT9-6AH2] (“[C]ritics argue that the agency has leaned toward a handsoff regulatory approach in recent years that has left it unprepared or unwilling to use the
powers it has and slow to step in as trouble brewed.”). My point is that, even with
improvements in oversight, the problems described in this Article would have existed.
35 There is also the question of whether commercial or investment banks “captured”
their regulators, influencing the degree to which they oversaw and supervised entities under
their charge. See, e.g., Norman S. Poser, Why the SEC Failed: Regulators Against
Regulation, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 289, 317 (2009) (“The SEC’s main focus
has changed from protecting investors to protecting the companies and investment firms
that the SEC is required to regulate.”); Luigi Zingales, The New York Fed: A “Captured”
Regulator, IL SOLE 24 ORE (It.) (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/englishversion/2014-09-30/the-new-york-fed-captured-regulator-053840.shtml?uuid=ABCwCUyB
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of the coordination concerns, the gap between regulators exists today. The
need for greater regulatory coordination continues in light of convergence in
the financial markets. And a better understanding of the problems leading up
to the financial crisis is important in helping address this need.

II. RAZING THE WALL: RISK-TAKING AND LEVERAGE
In this Part, I describe changes in the financial industry that led to the
commercial banks’ entry into the capital markets and changes in the capital
markets that resulted. Over time, bank regulators relaxed commercial bank
restrictions in an effort to enhance financial market stability. Greater
competition in the capital markets caused investment banks to seek new ways
to enhance revenues by increasing the risks they incurred. Investment banks
also borrowed in order to finance their entry into new business lines. The
greater risk-taking and leverage, in turn, sparked the failures by Bear Stearns
and Lehman Brothers, which were a principal catalyst of the 2007 financial
crisis.

A. Never the Twain
The Glass–Steagall Act’s regulatory wall held in place for decades.36
Between commercial and investment banks, never the twain would meet,
primarily due to concern over the risks commercial banks would face if they
entered the investment banking business.37 Bank regulation, however, began to
evolve,38 partly in response to change in the financial markets as new products
and services appeared39 and banks began to lose competitive ground to nonbanks.40 That change accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s41 with a rise in
[http://perma.cc/6JTN-LZ4P] (describing concerns over recent evidence of bank capture of
the New York Federal Reserve). This Article highlights a more basic problem—a structural
divide, causing commercial bank policies to work against stability in the capital markets—
without regard to whether the regulators were captured.
36 See Merkley & Levin, supra note 4, at 518.
37 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
38 See RESTORING, supra note 4, at 369.
39 See Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The
Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 677–
80 (1987) (describing the effect on banks of developments in technology and lending
practices).
40 See Franklin Allen & Anthony M. Santomero, The Theory of Financial
Intermediation, 21 J. BANKING & FIN. 1461, 1464–74 (1998) (summarizing the significant
“increase in the breadth and depth of financial markets”); Franklin R. Edwards & Frederic
S. Mishkin, The Decline of Traditional Banking: Implications for Financial Stability and
Regulatory Policy, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., July 1995, at 27, 28–32; Alan E. Sorcher &
Satish M. Kini, Does the Term “Bank Broker-Dealer” Still Have Meaning?, 6 N.C.
BANKING INST. 227, 232–33 (2002) (“[B]anks’ [ability to] earn[] a good and relatively riskfree living off the spread between those [relatively cheap] deposits and [low-risk,
marketable] assets . . . began to change gradually commencing in the 1950s.” (footnote
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competition between banks and non-banks,42 as well as a shift in capitalraising from traditional intermediation (such as lending by commercial banks)
to less-regulated alternatives,43 as the capital markets became a lower-cost
source of capital and risk-taking (such as through commercial paper and
bonds).44
A classic example is the combination of money market funds (MMFs) and
finance companies. For commercial banks, new regulatory capital
requirements made it more costly to continue the lending business as they had
before.45 MMFs and finance companies offered products and services that
were similar to what banks offered, but at competitive prices. MMFs are
required by the federal securities laws to invest in short-term, liquid, highquality debt instruments, such as Treasury bills and commercial paper.46 They
offer investors the convenience of a bank account, including checking
omitted)); Richard J. Herring & Anthony M. Santomero, What Is Optimal Financial
Regulation? 27–35 (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 00-34, 1999), http://
fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/00/0034.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z9XU-CL77] (arguing that
banks became “less special” during this time period).
41 See KERRY COOPER & DONALD R. FRASER, BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE NEW
COMPETITION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 195–217 (1984); ROBERT E. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD
BANKS DO? 33–59 (1987); Allen N. Berger et al., The Transformation of the U.S. Banking
Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip It’s Been, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY
55, 55, 127 (1995).
42 See LOWELL L. BRYAN, BREAKING UP THE BANK: RETHINKING AN INDUSTRY UNDER
SIEGE 22–28 (1988); COOPER & FRASER, supra note 41, at 2–17; Franklin Allen &
Anthony M. Santomero, What Do Financial Intermediaries Do?, 25 J. BANKING & FIN.
271, 274–82 (2001); Michael C. Keeley, Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in
Banking, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1183, 1184–86 (1990); Sorcher & Kini, supra note 40, at
232–34.
43 See Allen & Santomero, supra note 40, at 1466–74; Herring & Santomero, supra
note 40, at 27–30.
44 See Berger et al., supra note 41, at 68–70; Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K.
Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete
Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 244–47 (2008); Merton H. Miller, Financial
Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next, 21 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
459, 459–60 (1986); Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation, in 1A HANDBOOK OF THE
ECONOMICS OF FINANCE: CORPORATE FINANCE 307, 311–12 (George M. Constantinides et
al. eds., 2003).
45 See James R. Smoot, Bank Operating Subsidiaries: Free at Last or More of Same?,
46 DEPAUL L. REV. 651, 654–60 (1997); Kevin J. Stiroh, Diversification in Banking: Is
Noninterest Income the Answer?, 36 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 853, 853–55 (2004);
Robert DeYoung et al., Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S.
Commercial Banks 8–11 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City Econ. Research Dep’t, Research
Working Paper No. 10-02, 2010), https://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/
RESWKPAP/PDF/rwp10-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/NGC8-9FQE].
46 See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2011); see also INV. CO. INST. MONEY MKT. WORKING
GRP., REPORT OF THE MONEY MARKET WORKING GROUP 31–39 (2009),
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_09_mmwg.pdf [http://perma.cc/2Q5Q-F3XZ] (describing the
regulation of MMFs).
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services, toll-free telephone numbers, record-keeping, and wire transfers, but
with nominally higher returns than bank deposits.47 Finance companies, in
turn, lend to business and retail borrowers, relying on MMFs for funding
through the sale to them of short-term commercial paper.48 Together, the
relationship between MMFs and finance companies mirrors the traditional
balance between depositors and borrowers within a bank. After MMFs were
introduced, a substantial number of customers and billions of dollars in liquid
assets shifted from commercial banks to the capital markets.49
In response to greater competition, commercial banks began to offer new
and more-profitable products and services,50 turning to the regulators to
expand what was permissible under the Glass–Steagall Act.51 Regulators were
concerned with the financial impact of a weakened banking sector, reasoning
therefore that commercial banks should be permitted to diversify their income
sources.52 To permit banks to do so, they began to whittle away at regulations
that restricted the banks’ business activities.53 Subsequent passage of the
47 See FRANKLIN R. EDWARDS, THE NEW FINANCE: REGULATION & FINANCIAL

STABILITY 73–74 (1996).
48 See JANE W. D’ARISTA & TOM SCHLESINGER, ECON. POLICY INST., THE PARALLEL
BANKING SYSTEM 3–4, 7–14 (1993).
49 See D’ARISTA & SCHLESINGER, supra note 48, at 3–4, 7–14; EDWARDS, supra note
47, at 73–74.
50 See Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank
Regulation in a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 524–25 (1989) (noting that
the result of greater competition was “a gradual decline in [bank] profitability”). In general,
investment bank services were more profitable than commercial bank services. See Alastair
J. Cairns et al., The Limits of Bank Convergence, 2002 MCKINSEY Q., no. 2, at 41, 41–42.
51 See Thomas G. Fischer et al., The Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 51 TENN. L. REV. 467, 474–502 (1984); Sorcher & Kini,
supra note 40, at 233–34.
52 See Garten, supra note 50, at 530–31 (“The regulators’ recognition that improved
safety and soundness in the banking industry will come from product diversification
represents a revolution in bank regulatory strategy.”). For example, Alan Greenspan,
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, was alarmed by the declining role of banks in the
U.S. economy, arguing that “[p]ublic policy should be concerned with the decline in the
importance of banking. The issues are too important for the future growth of our economy
and the welfare of our citizens.” See Kenneth H. Bacon, Losing Ground: Banks’ Declining
Role in Economy Worries Fed, May Hurt Firms—It Could Weaken Usefulness of Monetary
Policy, Cut Funds for Small Business—Depositors Run Higher Risks, WALL STREET J.,
July 9, 1993, at A1.
53 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963,
972 (2009) (“During the 1980s and 1990s, federal regulators opened loopholes in the
Glass–Steagall wall in response to growing competitive pressures in the financial
marketplace. In 1987 and 1989, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) allowed bank holding
companies to underwrite debt and equity securities to a limited extent by establishing
‘Section 20 subsidiaries.’ During the 1990s, the FRB progressively relaxed its restrictions
on Section 20 subsidiaries. By 1997, those subsidiaries could compete effectively with
securities firms for underwriting mandates.” (footnote omitted)).
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Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act enabled banks and their affiliates to fully
participate in new business lines, including investment banking.54 Combining
banks and non-banks was intended, among other things, to make U.S. financial
intermediaries more competitive, particularly in the global markets where
universal banks—offering both commercial and investment bank products and
services—already existed.55

B. Commercial Bank Competition
Investment banks were wary of the commercial banks’ new-found ability
to compete in the capital markets.56 They were particularly concerned with
growing consolidation in the financial services industry.57 The result, in many
54 See Macey, supra note 6, at 692 (“[T]he Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act was, at its core,

ostensibly a bailout bill for the banking industry. The justification for the statute was that it
was needed to rescue a commercial banking industry that was thought to be obsolete.
Banks were thought to be in a ‘long downward spiral’ caused by ‘deep structural problems’
that threatened the existence of federally insured depository institutions and raised ‘the
specter of ongoing deposit-insurance cases.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring and the Market for Bank
Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1155 n.9 (1988))); Merkley & Levin, supra note 4, at
518 (“The rise of competition from investment banking and other ‘shadow banking’ firms
put pressure on commercial bankers, who responded by seeking to engage in activities that
had long been walled off.” (footnote omitted)).
55 Laurence H. Meyer, a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve,
noted, “Part of the motivation for the [Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act] was to put U.S. banking
organizations in a more competitive position. To the extent that securities and banking are
increasingly interconnected activities with power synergies, U.S. banking organizations are
better able to play in the global arena than they were before.” James Smalhout, US Bank
Regulation—Winners and Losers of New Finance Law, EUROMONEY, Dec. 1999, at 16.
56 See, e.g., The Goldman Sachs Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 12–13 (Feb. 11,
2000) [hereinafter Goldman Sachs 2000]; Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) 8 (Feb. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Lehman 2000]; Merrill Lynch & Co., Annual
Report (Form 10-K) 2 (Mar. 9, 2000) (noting that the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, among
other factors, increased the number of companies competing for a similar customer base);
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 9 (Feb. 25, 2000)
[hereinafter Morgan Stanley Dean Witter 2000]. Note that, in 1996, the Federal Reserve
raised the cap on revenues that commercial banks could earn through the underwriting
activities of their non-bank (“Section 20”) subsidiaries, easing the banks’ entry into the
investment bank business, even before repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act, although
commercial bank activity was still limited. See Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible
Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting and
Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,750 (Dec. 30, 1996).
57 See Goldman Sachs 2000, supra note 56, at 12 (noting possible acceleration of
consolidation and bank competition resulting from recently enacted federal financial
legislation); Morgan Stanley Dean Witter 2000, supra note 56, at 9 (noting that passage of
the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act may accelerate consolidation); see also Christian A.
Johnson, Holding Credit Hostage for Underwriting Ransom: Rethinking Bank Antitying
Rules, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 157, 174–75 (2002) (describing bank industry consolidation);
Randall Smith & Charles Gasparino, Lehman Tries to Thrive as a Solo Player as Mergers
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cases, was larger and better-capitalized firms that offered a wider range of
products and services than traditionally provided by investment banks alone.58
The investment banks had reason to worry. Commercial banks began to
compete head-to-head with investment banks, using lending relationships59
and their ability to access and commit capital60 at relatively low cost61 within a
contracting credit market62 to gain substantial market share in traditional
investment bank businesses, including equity and debt underwriting.63 They
Turn Its Rivals into Goliaths, WALL STREET J., Oct. 27, 2000, at C1 (“Lehman typifies the
handful of midsize securities firms that remain independent as the industry consolidates
around them.”).
58 See, e.g., Goldman Sachs 2000, supra note 56, at 12–13; Lehman 2000, supra note
56, at 8 (noting, in particular, higher capital resources); Morgan Stanley Dean Witter 2000,
supra note 56, at 9; see also Susan Chaplinsky & Gayle R. Erwin, Great Expectations:
Banks as Equity Underwriters, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 380, 389 (2009) (noting the growth
of the underwriting business through acquisition); Smith & Gasparino, supra note 57, at C1
(“With more companies pressuring financial-services firms to make capital commitments
to win roles in financing assignments, some say size matters.”).
59 See Suzanne McGee, Deals & Deal Makers: Chase Uses Its Lending Clout to Land
Underwriting Work, WALL STREET J., Dec. 23, 1999, at C20 (noting that Chase Manhattan
Bank was “willing to use its extensive lending relationships to muscle its way into stockunderwriting mandates”); Smith, supra note 20, at C1 (“[C]ommercial banks both domestic
and foreign, including Citigroup, have pressed their lending customers to include them in
more lucrative equity deals . . . .”).
60 See Smith, supra note 20, at C1 (noting that commercial banks “will use their
balance sheets” to win investment bank mandates, “and clearly this is an issue at the fore
because Citigroup has made a lot of progress and kind of pushed the issue”).
61 Commercial bank deposits, for example, are a relatively inexpensive and risk-free
source of funds, primarily due to insurance provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) (in general, up to $250,000 per depositor, per bank, in accounts that
meet FDIC requirements), which essentially makes those deposits risk free. See Garten,
supra note 50, at 516 (“The power to take deposits, particularly given the protection
afforded by deposit insurance and interest rate ceilings, not only provided banks with a
cheap source of funding, but also enabled banks to build relationships with potential
customers for other bank products, such as lines of credit, mortgages or credit cards.”);
Maretno Harjoto et al., A Comparison of Syndicated Loan Pricing at Investment and
Commercial Banks, FIN. MGMT., Winter 2006, at 49, 66 (finding investment banks lend to
less profitable, more leveraged firms, price more aggressively and offer longer-term credits
than commercial banks in syndicated loans).
62 See Johnson, supra note 57, at 173–75.
63 See Steven Drucker & Manju Puri, On the Benefits of Concurrent Lending and
Underwriting, 60 J. FIN. 2763, 2764–65 (2005) (finding that, for highly-leveraged and
below-investment-grade issuers, lending at the time of a seasoned equity offering
significantly increases the probability of current and future underwriting business);
Alexander Ljungqvist et al., Competing for Securities Underwriting Mandates: Banking
Relationships and Analyst Recommendations, 61 J. FIN. 301, 302 (2006) (“By most
accounts, commercial banks exploited their larger capital accounts to win underwriting
mandates.”); see also Morgan Stanley, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 28 (Feb. 25, 2004)
[hereinafter Morgan Stanley 2004] (pointing, in particular, to greater competition from
“firms that have commercial banking capabilities”).
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also began to acquire investment banks in order to capitalize on pre-existing
reputations in the capital markets,64 merging their bank and capital markets
businesses in order to offer clients a one-stop source of credit.65 As a result,
investment banks increasingly were pressured to lend to corporate clients66
who used the lure of lucrative investment bank mandates to enhance their
borrowing capability.67 The earlier Lucent/Agere example is just one
illustration of how this occurred.68
The effects were significant. Before the Glass–Steagall Act was repealed,
the commercial banks’ share of the bond underwriting market was
approximately ten percent,69 climbing to fifty-six percent by the end of the
1990s.70 Likewise, commercial banks made significant inroads into the
64 See George J. Papaioannou, Commercial Banks in Underwriters and the Decline of
the Independent Investment Bank Model, 9 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 79, 80–84 (2010) (noting that
the commercial banks acquired investment banks as an efficient means of developing
reputational and relationship capital quickly).
65 See Jennifer Morris, The Great League Table Debate, EUROMONEY, June 2001, at
116 (commenting that “the lending and securities businesses of most major institutions are
no longer separate and distinct divisions”); Christopher O’Leary, Solly’s Big Climb, INV.
DEALERS’ DIG., Apr. 30, 2001, at 16, 17, 20 (describing the merger of Salomon Brothers’
debt underwriting group and Citibank’s lending group, both subsidiaries of Citigroup).
Note that, while significant, lending alone was not the only factor that a prospective issuer
took into account in deciding which underwriter to select. Other factors, such as research
analyst coverage of the company, were also important. See Papaioannou, supra note 64, at
87–88.
66 See Jane Croft, Putting More Value on Credit Facilities, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005,
at 5 (“[A]n investment bank is seen to have a huge advantage over rivals if it can offer
clients vast loans or complex financial deals together with its M&A services.”); Patrick
McGeehan, Showdown on Wall Street; Banks Are Getting Business at the Expense of Elite
Firms, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/15/business/
showdown-on-wall-street-banks-are-getting-business-at-the-expense-of-elite-firms.html
[http://perma.cc/ZA67-9HDZ] (“Increasingly, companies . . . are demanding that Wall
Street firms extend big, barely profitable loans if they want to have a shot at the highly
profitable assignments of managing offerings of stock and bonds or advising on
mergers.”); see also The Goldman Sachs Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 15 (Feb. 5,
2007) [hereinafter Goldman Sachs 2007] (“[W]e have faced, and expect to continue to face,
pressure to retain market share by committing capital to business or transactions on terms
that offer returns that may not be commensurate with their risks.” (emphasis added)). Some
investment banks sought to manage the incremental credit risk through loan syndication
and derivatives. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley 2004, supra note 63, at 28.
67 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 20, at C1 (“[F]inancial-services firms [participating in a
new loan facility] will get priority in more lucrative assignments such as merger advice and
securities underwriting.”); Gregg Wirth & Michelle Celarier, Into the Crucible, INV.
DEALERS DIG., June 11, 2001, at 32 (“First Ford Motor Co., then Deutsche Telekom AG
and Vodafone Group Plc demanded that investment bankers looking for underwriting
mandates put their money on the table—or risk being left out of the deal flow.”).
68 See supra notes 20–30 and accompanying text.
69 See Anil Shivdasani & Wei-Ling Song, Breaking Down the Barriers: Competition,
Syndicate Structure, and Underwriting Incentives, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 581, 582 (2011).
70 See id.
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equities business, raising their share of equity underwriting from less than five
percent in 1995 to twenty-six percent in 2000.71 Overall, the likelihood of
having the same financial firm act as lender and underwriter increased
substantially, from only one percent of seasoned equity issuers in 1994 to over
twenty percent by 2001.72 The rise of commercial banks also contributed to
the use of more than one manager in a securities underwriting, further eroding
the revenues on which investment banks traditionally relied.73 Growing
competition squeezed the amounts that banks and non-banks could charge for
underwritings,74 placing even greater pressure on investment bank
profitability.75

71 See Chaplinsky & Erwin, supra note 58, at 382–83. Part of the increase resulted
from banks acquiring investment banks that had an existing underwriting business, even
though market share may have declined after the acquisition. Id. at 389.
72 See Drucker & Puri, supra note 63, at 2763.
73 See Robin Sidel et al., Investment Banks See Fees Shrink in Battle With New Rules,
Rivals, WALL STREET J. (May 18, 2004), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1084829
63092613803 [http://perma.cc/AV96-ZPQS] (describing the decline in revenues for
traditional investment bank services); see also Goldman Sachs 2007, supra note 66, at 53
(noting that the trend toward multiple book-runners and co-managers reduced the firm’s
revenues). Multiple-lead bond underwriting was nearly non-existent before 1995, but
comprised ninety-six percent of bond issues by 2008. See Shivdasani & Song, supra note
69, at 582–83 (arguing that commercial banks’ entry into bond underwriting spurred the
co-led underwriting structure and lowered screening incentives of underwriters). On the
equity side, IPO syndicate sizes decreased from 1997 to 2002, while the mean number of
co-managers rose. See Shane A. Corwin & Paul Schultz, The Role of IPO Underwriting
Syndicates: Pricing, Information Production, and Underwriter Competition, 60 J. FIN. 443,
445 (2005).
74 See Amar Gande et al., Bank Entry, Competition, and the Market for Corporate
Securities Underwriting, 54 J. FIN. ECON. 165, 167 (1999) (finding that bank entry into the
corporate debt market substantially reduced the amounts underwriters could charge);
Dongcheol Kim et al., The Impact of Commercial Banks on Underwriting Spreads:
Evidence from Three Decades, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 975, 989 (2008)
(finding a decline in average underwriting spreads from 1975 to 2004); see also Goldman
Sachs 2007, supra note 66, at 16 (reporting that equity and debt underwriting discounts, as
well as trading spreads, had been under pressure for a number of years); Merrill Lynch &
Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 24 (Feb. 27, 2006) (noting diminishing margins in
standard products as a result of intensifying competition).
75 See David Wells, Mergers Are Unpalatable but Necessary, FIN. TIMES, June 26,
2004, at M20 (“When bankers compete for mandates from clients, they face a scrum of
like-minded and similarly equipped rivals that includes more than a dozen names. . . . This
mass of competition squeezes margins and reduces profitability.”); Gregory Zuckerman et
al., Investors Hear a Takeover Wave, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 16, 2004),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107420645593293700 [http://perma.cc/6QKE-N5UM]
(noting that investment bank profits were booming, due to cost reductions and greater
proprietary trading, even though there was a decline in stock and underwriting business by
investment banks); Sidel et al., supra note 73 (“Total revenue at securities firms dropped
nearly 3% . . . despite a 25.3% gain in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Fees for
traditional services such as underwriting and merger advice are falling.”).
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On its face, the commercial banks’ ability to leverage lending into
investment banking was limited by federal anti-tying laws. The Bank Holding
Company Act generally prohibits a commercial bank from requiring a
prospective borrower to purchase another product or service from the bank or
refrain from purchasing a product or service from the bank’s competitors as a
condition to obtaining a loan.76 For example, a bank cannot condition a loan
on the borrower selecting it to be an underwriter or refraining from selecting a
competitor. The Act does, however, permit a bank to tie loans to “traditional
bank products,” such as deposits and trust services,77 an exception to the antitying rule that grew over time.78 Bank regulators historically construed the
tying prohibition narrowly, consistent with the limited scope of a bank’s
business activities under the Glass–Steagall Act. Following passage of the
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, however, lending relationships grew in importance
as a means to secure other (principally, investment banking) business.79 For
tying to occur, the regulators required some form of actual coercion by a
commercial bank, such as forcing a client to purchase the tied product in order
to obtain credit.80 None of this prohibited a customer’s actions in dealing with
a bank, such as demanding that the bank provide one product (a loan) in order
to receive other business (an underwriting), or a bank responding to a
customer’s request to bid on a package of bank and non-bank products and
services (including loans, strategic advisory services, and underwriting).81
Moreover, even though a bank could not condition a loan on the award of
investment banking business, it was permitted to offer more credit at lower
cost in order to attract additional business.82 Finally, so long as they were not
76 See 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (2012).
77 See id. § 1972(1)(A).
78 See Revisions Regarding Tying Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,473, 65,473–,474

(Dec. 20, 1994) (current version at 12 C.F.R. § 225.7 (2014)); see also Felix B. Chang,
Death to Credit As Leverage: Using the Bank Anti-Tying Provision to Curb Financial Risk,
9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 851, 859–65 (2013) (describing the expansion of the bank products
exception).
79 See, e.g., Shane A. Corwin & Mike Stegemoller, The Changing Nature of
Investment Banking Relationships 26 (Apr. 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (finding that
“the presence of a lending relationship [led] to a much stronger cross-over in [other
business] relationships, especially during [2003–2009]”), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2354565.
80 See Anti-Tying Restrictions of Section 106 of the Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments of 1970, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,024, 52,028–,029 (Aug. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Fed
Tying]; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, TODAY’S CREDIT MARKETS,
RELATIONSHIP BANKING, AND TYING 18–21 (2003) [hereinafter OCC TYING],
http://www.occ.gov/topics/laws-regulations/TyingWhitePaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/GST4PJ2V]. Courts, however, have split on whether coercion is a required element of tying. See
Chang, supra note 78, at 882–84.
81 See Fed Tying, supra note 80, at 52,029.
82 See Drucker & Puri, supra note 63, at 2765–66 (finding that commercial banks are
more likely to lower the cost of a loan in order to gain underwriting business, but that
investment banks are more likely to discount underwriting fees); Karthik Krishnan,
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coercive, banks could still consider the profitability of their total relationship
with a customer when deciding whether or not, and on what terms, to extend
or renew credit.83 Doing so was not considered to be tying so long as the
customer had the option to purchase traditional (with or without nontraditional) bank products.84 Consequently, bank regulators found little or no
evidence of illegal tying during the period,85 notwithstanding a chorus of
Commercial Banks Getting Underwriting Business: Tying or Business Building?, 66 J.
ECON. & BUS. 47, 50 (2013) (“[B]anks with underwriting ability engage in business
building activities using their lending as a means to attract underwriting business [rather
than tying].”). But see Charles W. Calomiris & Thanavut Pornrojnangkool, Relationship
Banking and the Pricing of Financial Services, 35 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 189, 221 (2009) (“Our
results on loan pricing provide evidence against the prevalence of [tying], since matched
loans that precede underwritings are charged a premium.”). Note that Sections 23A and
23B of the Federal Reserve Act prohibit national banks from charging below-market rates
on credit and other products in order to benefit non-bank affiliates. Those practices are
unsafe and unsound and contravene Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act. See
12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1 (2012). In general, Section 23A restricts a bank’s financial
transactions with its affiliates and specifies certain collateral requirements relating to
borrowings and other covered transactions. Section 23B also restricts transactions with
affiliates, in particular, by prohibiting a bank from extending credit to a borrower on
below-market terms where an affiliate participates in the transaction or otherwise benefits
from the extension of credit. The extension of credit must be on terms and conditions that
are substantially the same, or at least as favorable to the bank, as those for comparable
transactions not involving an affiliate and on terms and conditions that in good faith would
be offered to the borrower. See OCC TYING, supra note 80, at 30.
83 See Fed Tying, supra note 80, at 52,029; OCC TYING, supra note 80, at 5; see also
Gyöngyi Lóránth & Alan D. Morrison, Tying in Universal Banks, 16 REV. FIN. 481, 484
(2012) (“In centralized authority structures, lending decisions are made by a headquarters
that accounts for the combined value of lending and investment banking deals and hence
elects to tie the two whenever it is profitable to do so.”).
84 See Fed Tying, supra note 80, at 52,030. Since no single bank had the market
power to force borrowers to do business with it, customers could choose to borrow from a
different lender or in the public capital markets. See OCC TYING, supra note 80, at 8; see
also Letter from R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Jennifer
J. Johnson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 6–8 (Nov. 7, 2003),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2005/January/20050104/OP-1158/OP-1158_50_1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/JF93-NDJA] (noting that the anti-tying prohibition relates to the market
power of banks, and arguing that large borrowers who are able to access the syndicated
loan market, including a substantial number of bank and non-bank lenders, “are much less
likely to be victims of anti-competitive ties than small business customers or individual
consumers”).
85 See OCC TYING, supra note 80, at 30. The U.S. General Accounting Office found
limited evidence of tying in a 1997 report, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/GGD-97-58, BANK OVERSIGHT: FEW CASES OF TYING HAVE BEEN DETECTED 5
(1997), http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/224118.pdf [http://perma.cc/JB4F-NVWD],
although a 2003 report, following repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act, suggested that one
reason for the limited evidence of tying could be the borrowers’ reluctance to formally
complain to bank regulators, partly due to fear of the adverse consequences of doing so, see
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-3, BANK TYING: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO
ENSURE
EFFECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT
OF
TYING
PROHIBITIONS
4
(2003),
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complaints by borrowers that they were forced to direct additional business,
beyond traditional bank products, to the commercial banks.86

C. Changes in Investment Banking—Risk-Taking and Leverage
Investment banks responded quickly to the greater competition. And they
did so principally in three ways: reallocating resources to more profitable
businesses; taking greater risks; and increasing their borrowing.
The investment banks reallocated resources to products and services for
which they had a special reputation or expertise. For example, investment
banks had developed expertise in financial advisory work87 and in providing
clients with investment opportunities through new financial instruments88 and
internal hedge funds.89 In much the same way, they expanded their M&A
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-04-3/pdf/GAOREPORTS-GAO-043.pdf [http://perma.cc/HPG4-H6BR].
86 See ASS’N FOR FIN. PROF’LS, 2004 CREDIT ACCESS SURVEY: LINKING CORPORATE
CREDIT TO THE AWARDING OF OTHER FINANCIAL SERVICES 2 (2004),
http://www.afponline.org/pub/pdf/2004_06_09_pr_creditaccess_pdf.pdf [http://perma.cc/
YUH2-XX69] (“Nearly two-thirds of financial professionals from large companies report
that their commercial bank credit providers denied credit or changed the terms of credit
after the company did not award other financial business. . . . One out of seven large
companies report that in the past five years they have been explicitly required by a
commercial bank to obtain . . . underwriting services from an affiliate of the bank in order
to obtain a loan from the bank.”); see also Chang, supra note 78, at 873 (criticizing the
regulators’ reliance on bank examination results as “a bank-oriented perspective that does
little to factor in the input of borrowers”).
87 See Croft, supra note 66, at 5 (“There is no shortage of capital in the world but
there is a shortage of good ideas—and if you have a good idea, finding the capital to
support it is not a problem.”); Zuckerman et al., supra note 75 (“While banking rivals
continue to encroach on their turf by offering loans to clients as a way to sell clients more
services, Wall Street firms have largely maintained their hold on the most profitable
segments of their business. Advisory work on mergers and acquisitions, for example, still
is dominated by firms like Goldman Sachs Group Inc.”); see also Goldman Sachs 2007,
supra note 66, at 49 (noting emphasis on growth opportunities in advising middle-market
firms, as well as advising governments and investors on the sale and purchase of public
infrastructure assets).
88 See Morgan Stanley Research, Brokers and Asset Managers: Europe “en Fuego”—
An Update on the US Brokers in Europe 4 (Apr. 2, 2006) (noting that U.S. investment
banks were more profitable in Europe than J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup, “primarily
because their focus is on the higher margin/less commoditized products such as
derivatives, securitization and structured products”); see also Lehman Brothers Holdings
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 43 (Feb. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Lehman 2002]. Merrill
Lynch also expanded its derivatives business in 2004, which to that point had been an
underdeveloped area for the firm. See Merrill Lynch & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K)
14–15 (Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Merrill Lynch 2005].
89 Investment banks created internal hedge funds partly in order to provide investment
vehicles to clients who were closed out of existing funds. See Ann Davis, Wall Street
Builds The “Bionic” Hedge Fund, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 25, 2004),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB109865904955354142 [http://perma.cc/FZ9N-WDML]
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advisory, underwriting, trading, and asset management businesses by
leveraging existing client relationships,90 as well as finding other ways to
forge closer, more-rounded relationships with the same client base.91
The investment banks also began to incur greater risk as one means to
compensate for the loss in traditional business. As Figure 1 shows, following
repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act, the investment banks’ aggregate risks—as
measured by each firm’s Value at Risk (VaR)—grew substantially.92

(“[Internal hedge funds] give options to clients whom the firms are having trouble placing
in sought-after, independent funds closed to new investors.”). Assets under management
grew significantly within those funds. See id. (stating that assets under management for
five internal hedge funds at Goldman Sachs had grown to $9 billion). Firms also increased
assets under management by acquiring asset management companies. For example,
Morgan Stanley acquired Quilter Holdings Limited, a U.K.-based private client investment
management business, in 2001, see Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) 25 (Feb. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Morgan Stanley Dean Witter 2002];
FrontPoint Partners, a provider of absolute return investment strategies, in 2006; and a
minority interest in Avenue Capital Group, a New York-based investment manager with
sizable assets under management, in 2006, see Morgan Stanley, Annual Report (Form 10K) 65–66 (Feb. 12, 2007) [hereinafter Morgan Stanley 2007]. Lehman Brothers acquired
Lincoln Capital Management’s fixed income asset management business in 2003, see
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Annual Report (Feb. 26, Form 10-K) 9 (2004) [hereinafter
Lehman 2004], and Neuberger Berman Inc., another asset management company, in 2003,
see id. at 8. Greater asset management capability strengthened fee-based revenues and
broadened the products and services that could be offered to Lehman and Neuberger’s
clients. Id. Lehman Brothers also acquired assets from The Crossroads Group, a diversified
private equity fund manager. See id. at 9. In addition to growth through acquisition,
investment banks expanded their existing asset management businesses. See, e.g., Morgan
Stanley, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 33–34 (Feb. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Morgan Stanley
2005] (planning to grow “separately managed accounts, multi-discipline accounts and
alternative investment products”).
90 See, e.g., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 5 (Feb. 28,
2003) [hereinafter Lehman 2003] (emphasizing a “customer flow” model tied to crossselling the company’s advisory, market-making, and underwriting businesses); Morgan
Stanley 2005, supra note 89, at 33 (stating that the focus of the Institutional Securities
segment for 2005 was, among other things, to enhance client relationships and increase
market share).
91 See Sidel et al., supra note 73 (noting that, in order to develop relationships,
investment banks provide cheap loans and an array of other services including “act[ing] as
liaisons between companies and bond-rating agencies, arrang[ing] seminars and
conferences, ferry[ing] top executives around the world to meet institutional investors and
devot[ing] countless hours to crunching numbers and pulling together reams of marketrelated data for demanding clients”).
92 See Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 59
(2009) [hereinafter Coffee Testimony] (written statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A.
Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School) (showing a similar rise in VaR
for major underwriters from 2004 to 2007).
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Figure 1: Value at Risk of Investment Banks, 1998–200793
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93 The VaR data in Figure 1 is the daily average VaR for each annual period, in each

case calculated at a ninety-nine percent confidence level. VaR data were collected from
public filings by each investment bank and, if not already calculated at a ninety-nine
percent confidence level on a daily average basis, were converted to that confidence level.
In order to do so, VaR at a ninety-five percent confidence level was multiplied by 1.416
and, in order to adjust weekly or bi-weekly averages to daily averages (where applicable),
the product was then divided by the square root of 7 or 14 (depending on whether the
reported VaR data were weekly or bi-weekly). This approach to converting VaR is
consistent with financial industry standards. See Alexander Campbell, The Year of Living
Riskily, RISK, July 2008, at 28 (2008), http://www.risk.net/data/risk/pdf/articles/2008/028032_Risk_0708.pdf [http://perma.cc/MEU9-4Q99]. For Bear Stearns’ data, see The Bear
Stearns Cos., Annual Report (Form 10-K) exhibit 13, at 51 (Sept. 28, 1999) [hereinafter
Bear Stearns 1999]; The Bear Stearns Cos., Annual Report (Form 10-K) exhibit 13, at 58
(Feb. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Bear Stearns 2001]; The Bear Stearns Cos., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) exhibit 13, at 47 (Feb. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Bear Stearns 2003]; The Bear
Stearns Cos., Annual Report (Form 10-K) exhibit 13, at 55 (Feb. 14, 2005) [hereinafter
Bear Stearns 2005]; The Bear Stearns Cos., Annual Report (Form 10-K) exhibit 13, at 70
(Feb. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Bear Stearns 2007]; and The Bear Stearns Cos., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) exhibit 13, at 72 (Jan. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Bear Stearns 2008]. Data for
Goldman Sachs were not publicly available before 1999. For Goldman Sachs, data were
drawn from reports to shareholders. See The Goldman Sachs Grp., Annual Report (Form
10-K) 41 (Feb. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Goldman Sachs 2001]; The Goldman Sachs Grp.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K) 41 (Feb. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Goldman Sachs 2002]; The
Goldman Sachs Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 57 (Feb. 24, 2004) [hereinafter
Goldman Sachs 2004]; Goldman Sachs 2006, supra note 33, at 86; The Goldman Sachs
Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 89 (Jan. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Goldman Sachs 2008].
For Lehman Brothers, see Lehman 2000, supra note 56, exhibit 13, at 56; Lehman 2002,
supra note 88, exhibit 13, at 55; Lehman 2004, supra note 89, exhibit 13.01, at 60; Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 57 (Feb. 13, 2006) [hereinafter

784

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 76:4

VaR estimates the maximum potential loss a portfolio can suffer over x
period of time at y probability (“confidence level”) under normal
circumstances.94 To calculate VaR, a risk manager typically considers the
types of risks that are likely to affect a portfolio’s value, including historical
changes in market rates and prices.95 She then generates pro forma estimates
of value under those conditions and uses them to gauge the likelihood and
magnitude of future losses.96 To the extent VaR is consistently applied, it
Lehman 2006]; and Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 71 (Jan.
29, 2008) [hereinafter Lehman 2008]. For Merrill Lynch, see Merrill Lynch & Co., Annual
Report (Form 10-K) exhibit 13, at 51 (Mar. 5, 1999) [hereinafter Merrill Lynch 1999];
Merrill Lynch & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) exhibit 13, at 50 (Mar. 16, 2001)
[hereinafter Merrill Lynch 2001]; Merrill Lynch & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K)
exhibit 13, at 34 (Mar. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Merrill Lynch 2003]; Merrill Lynch 2005,
supra note 88, exhibit 13, at 39; Merrill Lynch & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 52
(Feb. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Merrill Lynch 2007]; and Merrill Lynch & Co., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) 47 (Feb. 24, 2009). For Morgan Stanley, see Morgan Stanley 2000, supra
note 56, exhibit 13.4, at 50; Morgan Stanley Dean Witter 2002, supra note 89, at 57;
Morgan Stanley 2004, supra note 63, at 73; Morgan Stanley 2006, supra note 33, at 95;
and Morgan Stanley, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 89 (Feb. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Morgan
Stanley 2008].
94 See KEVIN DOWD, BEYOND VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW SCIENCE OF RISK
MANAGEMENT 38–39 (1998). To use a simple illustration, suppose a risk manager is asked
to estimate VaR for a $100 million portfolio of high investment-grade five-year corporate
bonds over a one-month time horizon and with a ninety-nine percent confidence level. In
plain English, she would be asked to determine the maximum loss the portfolio could
suffer during 99 out of 100 months. To do so, she would need to first simulate prospective
returns on the portfolio, typically using historical data. If data on the bonds were
unavailable or insufficient, she would rely instead on data from a comparable security, such
as five-year U.S. Treasury notes (for which there is a substantial history). A 50-year period
would yield 600 one-month observations of when the Treasuries rose in value, declined, or
stayed the same, and the magnitude of any change. For simplicity, assume that (i) the
changes in monthly value ranged between minus and plus 4.2%, (ii) the two highest loss
rates were 4.0% and 4.2%, and (iii) there were three separate, one-month periods when
losses were 4.0% and three other one-month periods when losses were 4.2%. At a ninetynine percent confidence level, the risk manager would need to determine the worst one
percent of possible losses—which, extrapolating from the Treasury observations, would be
the six occurrences (6 ÷ 600 = 1%) when losses were four percent or worse. The risk
manager could then conclude that, at a ninety-nine percent confidence level, the $100
million bond portfolio would lose no more than 4.0% of its value, resulting in a VaR of $4
million (4% x $100 million). Stated differently, a VaR of $4 million would mean that the
portfolio’s maximum loss was projected to exceed $4 million during only one out of 100
one-month periods. See PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR
MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 17–20 (3d ed. 2006); see also Darrell Duffie & Jun Pan, An
Overview of Value at Risk, 4 J. DERIVATIVES 7, 8–9 (1997); Markus Leippold, Don’t Rely
on VaR, EUROMONEY, Nov. 2004, at 46 (“[V]aR as a risk measure fails theoretically; in
practice it gives rise to nonsensical results; and it is against our intuition of what we would
perceive as risk.”).
95 See Duffie & Pan, supra note 94, at 9–10.
96 See 3 OESTERREICHISCHE NATIONALBANK, GUIDELINES ON MARKET RISK—
EVALUATION OF VALUE AT RISK-MODELS 10 (Wolfdietrich Grau ed., 1999) [hereinafter
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provides a measure of a firm’s relative risk over time, even though there are
many versions of VaR and how VaR is calculated varies from firm to firm.97
VaR’s special attraction is its ability to sum up a firm’s market risk—its
risk of loss based on changes in the market value of its investments—in a
single number.98 Nevertheless, VaR has a number of weaknesses as a risk
management tool.99 For example, VaR is calculated using simplifying
assumptions that can distort results.100 Chief among them, VaR assumes that
market factors and portfolio returns fall along a normal distribution.101 Actual
returns, however, typically do not, particularly if the market is volatile or
correlations increase across a portfolio’s assets.102 VaR’s reliance on historical

GRAU, VAR-MODELS], http://www.oenb.at/en/Publications/Financial-Market/Publicationsof-Banking-Supervision.html [http://perma.cc/2TRU-AM2V] (describing three methods of
calculating VaR); Thomas J. Linsmeier & Neil D. Pearson, Value at Risk, 56 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 47, 59 (2000) (noting that all methods rely on historical data).
97 See INT’L MONETARY FUND, FINANCIAL MARKET TURBULENCE: CAUSES,
C ONSEQUENCES , AND P OLICIES 69 (2007), http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/
2007/02/pdf/text.pdf [http://perma.cc/UYC7-AXEW].
98 See GLYN A. HOLTON, VALUE-AT-RISK: THEORY AND PRACTICE 22–24 (2003);
Linsmeier & Pearson, supra note 96, at 47–48.
99 See infra text accompanying notes 100–07. VaR, nevertheless, has been a
cornerstone of global financial regulation. See Jón Daníelsson & Jean-Pierre Zigrand,
Equilibrium Asset Pricing with Systemic Risk, 35 ECON. THEORY 293, 294 (2008) (noting
that statistical risk models used to determine bank capital and risk are the “cornerstone” of
financial regulation); Jón Daníelsson et al., Incentives for Effective Risk Management, 26 J.
BANKING & FIN. 1407, 1407–08 (2002). Its endorsement by regulators reflected its growing
use and sophistication, see JORION, supra note 94, at 61; Markus Leippold et al.,
Equilibrium Impact of Value-At-Risk Regulation, 30 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1277,
1278 (2006) (“In 1996 VaR-based risk management had already emerged as common
market practice.”); David Mengle, Regulatory Origins of Risk Management, in MODERN
RISK MANAGEMENT: A HISTORY 417, 423–24 (Sarah Jenkins & Tamsin Kennedy eds.,
2003), in part, the result of declining costs to develop new VaR systems, see DOWD, supra
note 94, at 20. VaR also permitted regulators to assess market risk for individual firms over
time, see Darryll Hendricks & Beverly Hirtle, Bank Capital Requirements for Market Risk:
The Internal Models Approach, 3 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 8 (1997);
Jose A. Lopez, Regulatory Evaluation of Value-at-Risk Models, in THE VALUE-AT-RISK
REFERENCE 455, 458–59 (Jón Daníelsson ed., 2007), and to tie regulation to internal
measures rather than standards set by less well-informed outsiders, see, e.g., Risk-Based
Capital Standards: Market Risk, 64 Fed. Reg. 19,034, 19,035 (Apr. 19, 1999); DOWD,
supra note 94, at 222.
100 A list of VaR’s limitations appears in JORION, supra note 94, at 542–51, and
BENOIT B. MANDELBROT & RICHARD L. HUDSON, THE (MIS)BEHAVIOR OF MARKETS: A
FRACTAL VIEW OF RISK, RUIN, AND REWARD 272–74 (2004).
101 See 5 GRAU, VAR-MODELS, supra note 96, at 4.
102 See LINDA ALLEN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING MARKET, CREDIT, AND OPERATIONAL
RISK: THE VALUE AT RISK APPROACH 9–10 (2004); Tanya Styblo Beder, VAR: Seductive
but Dangerous, 51 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 12, 20 (1995); Szilárd Pafka & Imre Kondor,
Evaluating the RiskMetrics Methodology in Measuring Volatility and Value-at-Risk in
Financial Markets, 299 PHYSICA A 305, 309 (2001).
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data can also impair its accuracy.103 For instance, understating risk is
particularly likely when VaR is based on data from a period when market
volatility was unusually low104 or when it is calculated at higher confidence
intervals.105 In addition, VaR can understate risk if market conditions have
changed or the portfolio’s assets have only a limited performance history.106
Extreme events—like the 2007 financial crisis—are sufficiently rare that they
are unlikely to be reflected in historical data or a normal distribution.107
Finally, VaR fails to predict the magnitude of likely losses that can occur
outside the specified confidence level, known as the “tail” of the distribution.
For example, at a ninety-nine percent confidence level, VaR predicts the likely
maximum loss a firm will sustain ninety-nine percent of the time. It does not
predict loss levels during the remaining one percent, and those losses could be
considerably higher.
Still, on the whole, the firm-by-firm increase in VaR during 1998–2007, as
illustrated by Figure 1, reflects a rise in aggregate risk over the period. This
would make sense if each firm’s balance sheet was also growing. An increase
in assets implies a greater risk of loss if those assets decline in value
(assuming, for the moment, there are no benefits from diversification),108 but
not necessarily an increase in the riskiness of the investments the firm has
made. To illustrate, suppose a firm holds one asset valued at $100,000 with a
103 See DOWD, supra note 94, at 22.
104 See Linsmeier & Pearson, supra note 96, at 59–60. UBS (a large, multinational

financial services firm) relied on VaR to manage its structured investments, including
instruments tied to the subprime mortgage market. Following substantial losses, its
investigation revealed that VaR had been based on data during a period of positive growth
that did not adequately reflect its portfolio’s risks. See UBS AG, SHAREHOLDER REPORT ON
UBS’S WRITE-DOWNS 38 (2008), http://www.ubs.com/1/e/investors/releases?newsId=140339
[http://perma.cc/NTJ7-8LRR].
105 See Pafka & Kondor, supra note 102, at 309 (“[F]or higher significance levels fat
tails in the distribution of returns will make the simple RiskMetrics rule of calculating VaR
to underestimate risk.”).
106 See SENIOR SUPERVISORS GRP., OBSERVATIONS ON RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
DURING THE RECENT MARKET TURBULENCE 15 (2008), http://www.newyorkfed.org/
newsevents/news/banking/2008/SSG_Risk_Mgt_doc_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/XX78BTPS] (noting that consistent updates to volatility estimates made VaR more sensitive to
changing risks and that firms underestimated correlated risks between bonds and credit
default swaps during the crisis); Mico Loretan & William B. English, Evaluating
“Correlation Breakdowns” During Periods of Market Volatility 15–17 (Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Int’l Fin. Discussion Papers, Working Paper No. 658, 2000),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2000/658/ifdp658.pdf [http://perma.cc/JR3Q-TTZG].
107 See The Risks of Financial Modeling: VaR and the Economic Meltdown: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight, H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 111th
Cong. 56 (2009) (statement of Richard Bookstaber) (“[W]hich is to say that VaR is a good
measure of risk except when it really matters.”); Beder, supra note 102, at 20; Henry T. C.
Hu, The New Portfolio Society, SEC Mutual Fund Disclosure, and the Public Corporation
Model, 60 BUS. LAW. 1303, 1347 (2005).
108 See Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 73 (questioning the value of diversification in
consolidated financial firms, in particular, in light of the new risks that may be incurred).
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daily average VaR of $5,000 calculated at a ninety-nine percent confidence
level. If that firm doubled its investment in the same asset—purchasing
another asset also valued at $100,000—its total VaR would increase to
$10,000 ($5,000 for the first asset and $5,000 for the second). VaR, however,
would remain the same in relation to the firm’s total assets. That is because the
riskiness of the firm’s investments would not have increased. If riskiness had
increased—for example, if the second asset had a daily average VaR of
$10,000—then VaR relative to assets would have risen as well.
Figure 2 below sets out each firm’s VaR relative to assets during 1998–
2007. What is particularly interesting is that, except for Bear Stearns, VaR
relative to assets remained largely constant over the period.
Figure 2: Value at Risk Relative to Total Assets of Investment Banks,
1998–2007109
VaR/Total Assets
0.0014

Bear Stearns
Goldman Sachs
Lehman Brothers
Merrill Lynch
Morgan Stanley

0.0012
0.001
0.0008
0.0006
0.0004
0.0002
0
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002 2003
Year

2004

2005

2006

2007

For Bear Stearns, aggregate VaR110 and, more importantly, VaR/total
assets (reflecting the riskiness of Bear Stearns’ investments on a per-dollar-ofassets basis) increased significantly after 2004. Based on the rapid rise in
VaR/total assets, it is unsurprising that Bear Stearns was the first investment
bank to fall into trouble.111
109 The VaR data in Figure 2 are derived from the VaR data in Figure 1. See supra note
93. Data on total assets are drawn from the same sources as the data in Figure 3. See infra
note 141.
110 See supra Figure 1.
111 See, e.g., Michael D. Bordo, An Historical Perspective on the Crisis of 2007–2008
3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14569, 2008),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14569.pdf [http://perma.cc/BU6D-BRGX].
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For the remaining investment banks, VaR/total assets remained largely
constant, indicating that on average the riskiness of the firms’ businesses
remained unchanged on a per-dollar-of-assets basis.112 The increase would
still represent an overall rise in risk—a greater likelihood of bankruptcy—to
the extent there was a growth in leverage relative to equity capital in order to
fund the larger balance sheet. That risk is discussed in more detail below.113
More likely, however, the investment banks were less familiar with the
nature of the new risks they assumed, resulting in VaR being understated.114
For example, declines in the equity markets and a slowdown in M&A activity
caused firms to begin to focus on other, higher-margin activities.115 When the
markets recovered in 2003, firms increased trading—in many cases, using
their own capital—in order to take advantage of improving conditions.116 For
112 Cf. TOBIAS ADRIAN & HYUN SONG SHIN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,

PROCYCLICAL LEVERAGE AND VALUE-AT-RISK 10, 12 (2008), http://www.newyorkfed.org/
research/staff_reports/sr338.pdf [http://perma.cc/786X-EQ8E] (noting that unit VaR, VaR
per dollar of assets, for eight large commercial and investment banks “fluctuat[ed]
sharply”). Part of the difference may reflect the addition of J.P. Morgan Chase, Citibank,
and Bank of America to the group of five investment banks reflected in Figure 2. See id. at
10 n.5. Part of it may also reflect differences in time periods. The Adrian and Shin
calculations extended beyond 2007, when the most significant fluctuations occurred. See
id. at 10 fig.4. From December 2001 to December 2007, the VaR/total assets fluctuations
are noticeably less significant. See id.
113 See infra notes 139–74 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes 106–07 and infra notes 157–64 and accompanying text.
115 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. For example, Merrill Lynch explored
growth opportunities in derivatives, portfolio trading, secured financing, municipal bond
trading, foreign exchange, and prime brokerage. See Merrill Lynch & Co., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) 4 (Mar. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Merrill Lynch 2004].
116 See Susanne Craig & Gregory Zuckerman, Risky Business: Brokerage Firms Place
More Bets, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 24, 2004), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB108008117588063350 [http://perma.cc/VCM9-KBA2] (“Wall Street’s biggest
investment banks, riding a wave of strong stock markets and low interest rates, are taking
increasing risks with their own cash to boost profits. . . . The appetite for more risk is one
popular strategy aimed at lifting profits as other businesses face stiff competition and
thinning margins.”). For example, Goldman Sachs increased market risk from 2003 to
2005 in order to capitalize on trading and investment opportunities. See The Goldman
Sachs Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 78 (Feb. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Goldman Sachs
2005]; Goldman Sachs 2006, supra note 33, at 86; Goldman Sachs 2007, supra note 66, at
91; see also Lynn Cowan, Goldman Sachs Net Jumps 23% on Strength in Trading Profits,
WALL STREET J. (June 26, 2003), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB105654416276319300
[http://perma.cc/7R7Z-M62U] (noting that “[t]he company’s trading revenue was the sole
driver of its earnings” and that it “took on more trading risk during the quarter than at any
time since it first went public in 1999”); Jason Singer & Mitchell Pacelle, Citigroup to Bet
Its Own Chips, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 19, 2003), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB106919889771407600 [http://perma.cc/4JJ3-FL42] (noting that Goldman Sachs,
Lehman, and Morgan Stanley were among the firms that notched significant profits from
proprietary trading in stocks, bonds, derivatives, and currencies). Morgan Stanley increased
its allocation of economic capital to the Institutional Securities business, from $18 billion
in 2006 to $23.9 billion in 2007, in order to support the greater risks incurred in trading and
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many firms, non-investment-grade and highly-leveraged positions remained
steady or had only moderate growth from 1999 to 2002, but spiked upward
from 2003 to 2007,117 including greater participation in syndicated loan
facilities that financed highly-leveraged (and risky) private equity deals.118 At
the extreme, Lehman Brothers’ non-investment-grade positions grew almost
ten-fold from 2003 to 2007.119
In addition, virtually all investment banks increased their principal
investment and private equity activities.120 Some also expanded their blockinvestment, see Morgan Stanley 2008, supra note 93, at 73, and Merrill Lynch increased
risk-taking in growth areas such as proprietary trading and certain lending activities, see
Merrill Lynch 2004, supra note 115, at 4.
117 Bear Stearns’ net high yield positions grew steadily from $1.1 billion in 1999 to $6
billion in 2004, and to $10.1 billion by 2006 (all at year end). See Bear Stearns 2001, supra
note 93, exhibit 13, at 53; Bear Stearns 2005, supra note 93, exhibit 13, at 44; Bear Stearns
2007, supra note 93, exhibit 13, at 56. Merrill Lynch’s trading exposure to non-investmentgrade and highly-leveraged issuers shrank between 1998 and 2001, see Merrill Lynch
1999, supra note 93, exhibit 13, at 53; Merrill Lynch 2001, supra note 93, exhibit 13, at 51,
but grew over six-fold from $4.6 billion in 2001, see Merrill Lynch & Co., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) exhibit 13, at 38 (Mar. 14, 2002), to over $29 billion in 2006, see Merrill
Lynch 2007, supra note 93, at 60.
118 See David Wighton, Bank Lending on Buy-Outs Soars, FIN. TIMES (July 17, 2006),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/27a2bbda-1530-11db-b391-0000779e2340.html [http://perma.cc/
5V9Q-DRFT] (describing the dramatic expansion of investment bank lending to leveraged
buy-outs, including non-investment grade companies); David Wighton, The Great Big
Balance Sheet Debate, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2005), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7e134f7a821a-11d9-9e19-00000e2511c8.html#axzz3qHQOBoEn [http://perma.cc/XMV8-QFVL]
(noting that Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman increased their
participation in U.S. syndicated bank facilities by eighty-five percent between 2001 and
2002, twenty-nine percent in 2003, and twenty-seven percent in 2004).
119 The size of Lehman’s high-yield positions (excluding hedges) ranged between $3
billion to $12.8 billion from 1999 and 2006, jumping to $30.4 billion in 2007 (including
hedges). See Lehman 2000, supra note 56, exhibit 13, at 45; Lehman 2002, supra note 88,
exhibit 13, at 49; Lehman 2003, supra note 90, at 7; Lehman 2004, supra note 89, exhibit
13.01, at 63; Lehman 2006, supra note 93, at 63; Lehman 2008, supra note 93, at 62.
120 For example, Goldman Sachs showed strong growth in principal investment from
2003 to 2007. See The Goldman Sachs Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) exhibit 13.1, at
34 (Feb. 27, 2003); Goldman Sachs 2005, supra note 120, at 49; Goldman Sachs 2006,
supra note 33, at 53; The Goldman Sachs Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 67 (Jan. 27,
2009). In 2006, Morgan Stanley announced plans to double the size of its principal
investment activity in order to improve financial performance, from $1.2 billion in 2005 to
approximately $2.5 billion. See Morgan Stanley 2006, supra note 33, at 88. Merrill
Lynch’s substantial increase in earnings from asset-based lending and principal investment
activities in 2003 led the firm to increase its risk profile the next year. See Merrill Lynch
2005, supra note 88, exhibit 13, at 23, 39. Merrill Lynch also had a large and increasing
amount of proprietary trading and investment positions, which included proprietary trading
positions in fixed income, currency, commodities, and equity securities, as well as in real
estate, private equity, and other investments. See Merrill Lynch 2007, supra note 93,
exhibit 13, at 16. Bear Stearns’ merchant bank and private equity investments fluctuated
from 1999 to 2003, but grew significantly between 2003 and 2006. See Bear Stearns 1999,
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trading business—buying a large amount of stock from a single seller and then
re-selling the shares, often in the public market—taking on greater
concentrations of risk around the positions they held.121 Moreover, as
investment banks grew their mortgage securitization businesses, some also
acquired residential mortgage loan originators and servicers. By doing so, they
could source loan products at a lower cost, but at the risk of a drop in the value
of those assets before they were repackaged as part of a securitization and sold
to investors.122
Credit risk also increased. Firms entered into swap and loan agreements
for longer periods with lower-credit firms, accepted less liquid collateral, and
realized lower profits relative to the credit risk they assumed.123 Some also
expanded their universe of counterparties to include lower-credit, middlemarket firms.124
Each of the new business lines involved new or different risks, which may
not have been properly considered in calculating each bank’s VaR.125 Of
course, one cannot rule out the possibility that the firms or their employees
supra note 93, exhibit 13, at 43; Bear Stearns 2001, supra note 93, exhibit 13, at 52; The
Bear Stearns Cos., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 35 (Feb. 28, 2002); Bear Stearns 2003,
supra note 93, exhibit 13, at 38–39; The Bear Stearns Cos., Annual Report (Form 10-K)
exhibit 13, at 38 (Feb. 27, 2004); Bear Stearns 2005, supra note 93, exhibit 13, at 43–45;
The Bear Stearns Cos., Annual Report (Form 10-K) exhibit 13, at 54, 56 (Feb. 22, 2006);
Bear Stearns 2007, supra note 93, at 55, 57.
121 See THE BUCKINGHAM RESEARCH GRP., BROKERS, MONEY CENTER AND TRUST
BANKS 15 (2003) (noting the increased use of “bought” deals to enhance equity
underwriting profits, where the investment bank buys stock from a client as principal, with
a view to reselling it in the public markets at a higher price); Sidel et al., supra note 73
(noting investment banks’ “aggressive” move into block trades, leaving some banks
“nursing substantial losses when a sudden stock-price decline left them holding large
blocks of stock purchased at above-market levels”); see also Goldman Sachs 2007, supra
note 66, at 53; Morgan Stanley 2007, supra note 89, at 16.
122 In 2003, Lehman Brothers acquired several mortgage loan companies, including
Aurora Loan Services. See Lehman 2004, supra note 89, exhibit 13, at 39. Morgan Stanley
acquired portions of the U.S. real estate equity advisory businesses of Lend Lease
Corporation in 2003. See Morgan Stanley 2004, supra note 63, at 52. It also acquired Saxon
Capital, Inc., a residential mortgage loan and service provider, in 2006. See Morgan
Stanley 2007, supra note 89, at 65.
123 See, e.g., Lehman 2008, supra note 93, at 37 (stating that the firm may transact with
new clients, deal in new asset classes, and enter new markets, even in the face of possible
credit concerns); Morgan Stanley 2006, supra note 33, at 18–19 (acknowledging that the
amount, duration, and range of credit risks had been increasing and could continue to do
so).
124 See Goldman Sachs 2007, supra note 66, at 49 (stating the firm’s intention to
provide services to middle-market companies). Merrill Lynch increased its middle-market
exposure in 2004, see Merrill Lynch 2005, supra note 88, exhibit 13, at 19, but sold its
wholly-owned middle-market commercial financing business in 2007 when the firm
decided to slash its non-core assets, see Merrill Lynch & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K)
23 (Feb. 25, 2008).
125 See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text.
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manipulated VaR in order to understate the amount of risk they actually
incurred. J.P. Morgan provides a recent, well-known example of the ability of
an inaccurate VaR model to mask risk-taking. Bruno Iksil, nicknamed the
“London Whale” for the size of his trading portfolio, was a proprietary trader
in J.P. Morgan’s chief investment office (CIO) who realized losses of up to
$6.2 billion in 2012.126 J.P. Morgan had implemented a new VaR model that
failed to properly reflect the risks the CIO incurred. After returning to the old
model, average daily VaR almost doubled, from $67 million during the first
quarter of 2011 to $129 million during the first quarter of 2012 (rising to $186
million by the end of the quarter).127 The decision to adopt an alternative VaR
model had been motivated by the CIO’s interest in manipulating VaR in order
to continue trading without exceeding J.P. Morgan’s internal risk limits.128
Finally, investment banks responded to the greater competition from
commercial banks by increasing their borrowings, as illustrated in Figure 3
below. Greater leverage enabled investment banks to enhance profitability by
investing in and trading more assets.129 Leverage among investment banks
generally was on the decline until 2004, when the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) amended the net capital requirements130 applicable to
126 See Shannon D. Harrington et al., JPMorgan Trader Iksil Fuels Prop-Trading

Debate with Bets, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0409/jpmorgan-trader-iksil-fuels-prop-trading-debate-with-bets.html [http://perma.cc/HMN2L2FA]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan Sues Boss of ‘London Whale’ in Trading
Loss, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/jpmorgan-suesboss-of-london-whale/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/8X2J-38DF].
127 See Christopher Whittall, Value-at-Risk Model Masked JP Morgan $2 Bln Loss,
REUTERS (May 11, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/11/jpmorgan-varidUSL1E8GBKS9201 20511 [http://perma.cc/EY28-Q8EM].
128 See JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and
Abuses: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 113th Cong. 14 (2013), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chase-whale-trades-a-case-history-of-derivatives-risks
-and-abuses [http://perma.cc/7DER-ACCB] (“Previously undisclosed evidence also
showed that CIO personnel deliberately tried to lower the CIO’s risk results and, as a
result, lower its capital requirements, not by reducing its risky assets, but by manipulating
the mathematical models used to calculate its VaR . . . results.”).
129 See TOBIAS ADRIAN & HYUN SONG SHIN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., THE
CHANGING NATURE OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007–
09, at 9–12, 18 (2010), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr439.pdf
[http://perma.cc/E78X-LVMB] (noting that, for financial intermediaries, leverage grows
when balance sheets are growing, and borrowings increase in order to expand balance sheet
size); see also Erin Callan, Chief Fin. Officer, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.,
Presentation: Lehman Brothers—Leverage Analysis (Apr. 7, 2008), http://web.stanford.edu
/~jbulow/Lehmandocs/docs/DEBTORS/LBEXDOCID%201401225.pdf [http://perma.cc/
KD4T-PDMS] (noting that “[l]everage for the industry and for Lehman Brothers has
increased significantly and has been a key driver of improved profitability”).
130 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains provisions that are designed to
assure the financial responsibility of investment banks, including Section 15(c)(3), 15
U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (2012). Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2015), does so, in part,
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them.131 Introduction of the amendment is marked in Figure 3 as “Net Capital
Rule Amendment.” Prior to the amendment, net capital was calculated using
fixed percentage deductions (referred to as “haircuts”) in the value of a firm’s
securities holdings, reflecting the risk of each type of security.132 As amended,
securities firms within a group that consented to SEC supervision were eligible
to compute net capital using an alternative formula.133 On that basis, the five
largest broker-dealers134 began to calculate net capital using internallygenerated VaR models rather than preset deductions.135 In order to ensure that
by limiting the amount of indebtedness an investment bank can incur relative to its net
capital. “Net capital” is defined in Rule 15c3-1(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2) (2015),
as the investment bank’s net worth (the excess of total assets over total liabilities), adjusted
by adding unrealized profits and deducting unrealized losses, and by making certain
specified additional deductions.
131 The U.S. Government Accountability Office noted a similar upward trend in
leverage, measured using the asset-to-equity ratios of Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers,
Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09739, FINANCIAL CRISIS HIGHLIGHTS NEED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF LEVERAGE AT
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACROSS SYSTEM 40–41 & fig.6 (2009) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT], http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-739 [http://perma.cc/EC65-EBUB].
132 See Erik R. Sirri, Dir., SEC Div. of Trading & Mkts., Remarks at the National
Economists Club: Securities Markets and Regulatory Reform (Apr. 9, 2009) [hereinafter
Sirri Remarks], http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch040909ers.htm [http://perma.cc/
Q5SZ-BUC3].
133 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-1(a)(7), 240.15c3-1e(d); see also Alternative Net
Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers that Are Part of Consolidated Supervised
Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428, 34,472 (June 21, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1)
[hereinafter Alternative Net Capital].
134 The five firms that adopted the alternative calculation (Bear Stearns, Goldman
Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley) are no longer independent
companies or have become bank holding companies subject to Federal Reserve oversight.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Analyzing the Credit Crisis: Was the SEC Missing in Action?,
CORP. COUNS. (Dec. 5, 2008), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202426495544 [http://
perma.cc/4MHR-BELJ]. All five or their successors, however, continue to rely on Rule
15c3-1e to compute regulatory capital for SEC purposes. See, e.g., The Goldman Sachs
Grp., Quarterly Report for the Period Ended Mar. 31, 2010 (Form 10-Q) 73 (May 7, 2010);
JPMorgan Chase & Co., Quarterly Report for the Period Ended June 30, 2010 (Form 10-Q)
63 (Aug. 6, 2010) (after acquiring Bear Stearns); Merrill Lynch & Co., Quarterly Report
for the Period Ended June 30, 2010 (Form 10-Q) 77 (Aug. 6, 2010) (after being acquired
by Bank of America); Morgan Stanley, Quarterly Report for the Period Ended Mar. 31,
2010 (Form 10-Q) 64 (May 7, 2010). Lehman Brothers was acquired by Barclays Capital,
a non-U.S. financial services firm, which obtained temporary relief from the SEC to
continue to calculate capital charges pursuant to Rule 15c3-1e for the Lehman Brothers
positions it purchased. See Order Granting Temporary, Conditional Relief from the Net
Capital Rule for Barclays Capital, Inc., 73 Fed. Reg. 55,571 (Sept. 25, 2008).
135 This new approach to regulation—relying, in part, on models to assess a portfolio’s
riskiness—was being adopted by both commercial and investment bank regulators at
roughly the same time. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 19, at 21–22; Coffee Testimony, supra
note 92, at 60–61. The SEC intended for its program to be broadly consistent with the
Federal Reserve’s oversight over bank holding companies. See id at 60.
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net capital did not decline, the SEC required firms that elected the alternative
formula to file an early warning notice if net capital fell below $5 billion, an
amount comparable to the capital they maintained prior to the 2004
amendment.136 The ability to more flexibly calculate net capital, however,
gave investment banks the opportunity to increase their borrowings,137 even
though leverage caps remained unchanged.138
As indicated in Figure 3 below, investment bank leverage increased
significantly, with some estimates showing debt-to-equity ratios on average
jumping from 22:1 to 33:1 within three years following adoption of the new
requirements.139 Firms increased leverage in response to changes in the
financial industry and new business opportunities. Greater borrowing meant
that an investment bank could purchase and hold additional assets, potentially
increasing its profitability.140

136 See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 131, at 39; Sirri Remarks, supra note 132.
137 See Coffee Testimony, supra note 92, at 57–58; Lee A Pickard, SEC Exemption

That Fanned Crisis Remains on the Books, AM. BANKER, Oct. 3, 2012, at 4 (stating that,
under the alternative formula, broker-dealers “were relieved from . . . very important
capital charges found in the traditional net capital rule,” including a shift away from
prescribed haircuts to a reliance on internal models to calculate haircuts). This was, in fact,
what the SEC expected would occur under the alternative formula. See Alternative Net
Capital, supra note 133, at 34,428 (“These amendments are intended to reduce regulatory
costs for broker-dealers by allowing very highly capitalized firms that have developed
robust internal risk management practices to use those risk management practices, such as
mathematical risk measurement models, for regulatory purposes. A broker-dealer’s
deductions for market and credit risk probably will be lower under the alternative method
of computing net capital than under the standard net capital rule.”).
138 See Sirri Remarks, supra note 132.
139 See Viral V. Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity
Requirements, in REGULATING WALL STREET 143, 149 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011).
I am reluctant to argue that the 2004 amendment caused the increase in leverage levels. As
this article illustrates, a number of factors encouraged greater risk-taking and leverage by
the investment banks. The change in net capital requirements, however, made it possible
for investment banks to increase their leverage in response to those factors.
140 See GAO REPORT, supra note 131, at 39–40 (“To the extent that the use of their
internal models . . . enabled them to reduce the amount of their haircuts, they could take on
larger proprietary positions . . . .”). Investment banks may have been able to increase
leverage partly due to the limited oversight by SEC staff. Although firms that adopted the
alternative formula were expected to be subject to greater and more tailored scrutiny, see
id. at 41–42, the limited number of SEC staff, the absence of formal authority to limit an
investment bank’s leverage, and the alternative formula’s reliance on each firm’s
individualized VaR model made effective oversight difficult, see Coffee Testimony, supra
note 92, at 61; see also Stephen Labaton, Agency’’ ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at A1 (“The supervisory program . . . was a low priority.”).
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Figure 3: Debt-to-Equity Ratios of Investment Banks, 1998–2007141
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141 Debt-to-equity ratios typically are used to assess a firm’s riskiness. The ratio
indicates the margin for error that exists if assets are liquidated to satisfy creditors’ claims.
See, e.g., John K. Ford, Credit Analysis: The Debt-to-Equity Ratio and Firm Performance,
10 COM. LENDING REV. 88, 88 (1995). Due to its importance, the debt-to-equity ratio is one
of the most closely-watched financial health indicators for creditors and investors. See
STEVEN M. BRAGG, BUSINESS RATIOS AND FORMULAS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 110–11
(3d ed. 2012). The debt-to-equity ratios in Figure 3 are calculated as the remainder that
results from dividing an investment bank’s total liabilities by its stockholders’ equity. Data
used to calculate the debt-to-equity ratios were collected from public filings by each
investment bank. For Bear Stearns, see Bear Stearns 1999, supra note 93, exhibit 13, at 56;
Bear Stearns 2001, supra note 93, at 64; Bear Stearns 2003, supra note 93, at 53; Bear
Stearns 2005, supra note 93, exhibit 13, at 65; Bear Stearns 2007, supra note 93, at 80; and
Bear Stearns 2008, supra note 93, exhibit 13, at 82. For Goldman Sachs, see Goldman
Sachs 2001, supra note 93, exhibit 13.1, at 48; Goldman Sachs 2002, supra note 93, at 48;
Goldman Sachs 2004, supra note 93, exhibit 13.1, at 69; Goldman Sachs 2006, supra note
33, at F-3; and Goldman Sachs 2008, supra note 93, at 110. For Lehman Brothers, see
Lehman 2000, supra note 56, exhibit 13, at F-3; Lehman 2002, supra note 88, exhibit 13, at
60–61; Lehman 2004, supra note 89, exhibit 13.01, at 69; Lehman 2006, supra note 93, at
72–73; and Lehman 2008, supra note 93, at 86–87. For Merrill Lynch, see Merrill Lynch
1999, supra note 93, exhibit 13, at 58–59; Merrill Lynch 2001, supra note 93, at 56–57;
Merrill Lynch 2003, supra note 93, at 44–45; Merrill Lynch 2005, supra note 88, exhibit
13, at 50–51; Merrill Lynch 2007, supra note 93, at 72–73; and Merrill Lynch 2009, supra
note 93, at 53–54. For Morgan Stanley, see Morgan Stanley Dean Witter 2000, supra note
56, exhibit 13.5, at 55–56; Morgan Stanley, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 74–75 (Feb. 19,
2003); Morgan Stanley 2004, supra note 63, at 82–83; Morgan Stanley 2006, supra note
33, at 107–08; and Morgan Stanley 2008, supra note 93, at 101–02.
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Although borrowing increased after 2004, some have argued that leverage
was not a significant factor leading to the 2007 financial crisis,142 partly
because average leverage ratios were substantially higher in the 1980s and
1990s.143 Nevertheless, leverage for the largest investment banks was
significant. Assume, for illustration, that the debt-to-equity ratio of an
investment bank was 30 to 1. As Figure 3 indicates, all of the large investment
banks, except Goldman Sachs, reached that level within three years after 2004.
That would mean, for every $30 in assets a firm held, only $1 in equity was
available to cover losses. Consequently, a less than four percent drop in the
value of a firm’s total assets would deplete the firm’s equity—causing
liabilities to exceed assets, and wiping the firm out.
Moreover, a focus only on leverage ratios understates the risks that
investment banks incurred during the period. First, in hindsight, it is clear that
the published leverage ratios failed to fully reflect the amount of borrowings
by investment banks and their affiliates.144 Investment banks relied on offbalance-sheet special purpose vehicles145 in order to hold and finance
substantial asset positions.146 For example, as a percentage of total assets, offbalance-sheet assets held by Bear Stearns nearly tripled, from 3.46% to

142 See, e.g., Andrew W. Lo, Reading About the Financial Crisis: A Twenty-One-Book
Review, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 151, 153, 176 (2012).
143 See, e.g., Bruce Mizrach, Accounting for the Crisis 3 (May 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1894805. The same was true for the largest
commercial banks, although the difference in leverage ratios was generally less than for
investment banks. See id. at 4.
144 Among other reasons to understate leverage, hiding the total amount that has been
borrowed enables a debtor to borrow at more attractive rates. See Franco Modigliani &
Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment,
48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 273 (1958) (“Economic theory and market experience both
suggest that the yields demanded by lenders tend to increase with the debt-equity ratio of
the borrowing firm (or individual).”); see also Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction—
Structured Finance and Credit Market Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53,
59 (2009) (illustrating lower borrowing costs). Moving assets off the balance sheet to
structured investment vehicles and other financing conduits may also minimize regulatory
costs. See Floyd Norris, High and Low Finance; No Way To Make A Loan, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 19, 2007), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CEEDF143
CF93AA25753C1A9619C8B63 [http://perma.cc/BGT5-N58W].
145 “Special purpose vehicles” (SPVs) are often used to finance the purchase and
holding of assets. They are usually created by the firm that transfers those assets to the
SPV, often for a specific purpose or transaction. Among their characteristics, SPVs
typically are thinly capitalized, have no independent management or employees, may be
administered by a trustee who follows pre-specified rules, and are structured to minimize
the likelihood of bankruptcy. See Gary Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, Special Purpose
Vehicles and Securitization 1–2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 05-21,
2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=713782.
146 See Coffee Testimony, supra note 92, at 72.
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11.32%, between February 2005 and May 2007.147 The SEC’s net capital rule
applied only to broker-dealers and did not extend to investment bank
activities—such as originating, warehousing, and financing real estate
mortgages—that took place outside the broker-dealer entity.148 In addition,
Lehman Brothers’ leverage ratio is likely to have been understated due to its
reliance on repo transactions149 it believed could move assets off its balance
sheet.150
Second, consolidation within the financial services industry resulted in
growing concentrations of risk151 as commercial banks combined with
investment banks152 and investment banks combined with mortgage
originators and servicers.153 Greater scale was a natural outcome of growing

147 See Bruce Mizrach, Comment on Jon Danielsson et al., Endogenous and Systemic

Risk, in QUANTIFYING SYSTEMIC RISK 94, 99 (Joseph G. Haubrich & Andrew W. Lo eds.,
2013).
148 See Sirri Remarks, supra note 132 (“[T]he aggregate indebtedness standard does
not limit the amount of assets the broker-dealer could take on through financing
transactions. Substantial portions of the balance sheets of the [largest investment banks]
were comprised of these types of financing transactions.”).
149 See infra notes 165–69 and accompanying text.
150 Lehman Brothers used “Repo 105” (also referred to as “Repo 108”) contracts to
temporarily remove securities from its balance sheet, usually for seven to ten days. See
ANTON R. VALUKAS, LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC. CHAPTER 11 PROCEEDINGS
EXAMINER’S REPORT, 3 REPO 105, 732, 744 (2010), http://jenner.com/lehman
[http://perma.cc/WL7P-M2RJ]. Although Lehman Brothers agreed to repurchase the assets
from the counterparty, the transactions were treated as sales (rather than financing
transactions) based on the amount of over-collateralization. See id. at 732. Under Repo
105/108, securities sold were valued at a minimum of 105% (for fixed-income securities)
or 108% (for equity securities) of market value, which was significantly greater than the
normal market rate of 102%. See id. at 732, 767, 777. The greater discount (or haircut)
permitted Lehman Brothers to treat the transaction as a sale of the underlying securities.
See id. at 779–80. Lehman Brothers had a particular interest in keeping its leverage ratio
low. It had purchased substantial amounts of residential mortgage-backed securities, and in
the face of potential concerns by creditors over their value, Lehman Brothers wanted to
maintain as low a leverage ratio as possible. See Charles Hines et al., An Analysis of
Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy and Repo 105 Transactions, 26 AM. J. BUS. 40, 40–41
(2011).
151 See GROUP OF TEN, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CONSOLIDATION IN THE
FINANCIAL SECTOR 144 (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter BIS REPORT], http://www.bis.org/
publ/gten05.htm [http://perma.cc/4X7P-FVZF] (noting that “the evolution of non-bank
financial institutions in the United States, including their increasing ability to affiliate with
banks, has reached the point where the scale and level of participation in financial markets
of a number of these institutions is sufficient to make their financial impairment a
potentially systemic event”); Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 77.
152 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
153 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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competition in the marketplace. Scale economies permitted larger financial
institutions to lower costs and enhance profitability.154
Third, as Figure 4 below illustrates, the investment banks (except Bear
Stearns after 2006) appear to have managed their risk-taking by reference to
the amount of equity capital they held.155 Except for Bear Stearns, the ratios
remained relatively constant over the period, suggesting that the investment
banks moderated the amount of risk they incurred relative to equity capital or
adjusted equity capital to reflect changes in risk-taking. Greater risk-taking
raised the risk of insolvency. Consequently, it was important for the
investment banks to understand the nature and extent of the new risks they
assumed.
Figure 4: VaR-to-Equity Ratios of Investment Banks, 1998–2007156
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154 See Robert DeYoung & William C. Hunter, Deregulation, the Internet, and the
Competitive Viability of Large Banks and Community Banks, in THE FUTURE OF BANKING
173, 193–94 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2003).
155 Adrian and Shin also find that VaR/equity is a “good approximation” of the way in
which financial firms manage risk. See Adrian & Shin, supra note 112, at 12. Their
conclusion is based on a review of VaR/equity for the five investment banks plus J.P.
Morgan Chase, Citibank, and Bank of America. See id. at 10 n.5, 12. Credit rating agencies
also use VaR/capital as one factor in assessing an investment bank’s credit quality, which
reinforces the firms’ interest in monitoring VaR relative to equity capital. See, e.g., FITCH
RATINGS, SECURITIES FIRM CRITERIA 17 (2014), http://www.fitchratings.co.jp/ja/images/
RC_20140131_Securities%20Firms%20Criteria_ EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/9CPB-QRQV]
(stating that average VaR/“Fitch Core Capital” is a “key ratio”).
156 The VaR data in Figure 4 are derived from the VaR data in Figure 1. See supra note
93. Data on equity are drawn from the same sources as the data in Figure 3. See supra note
141.
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Nevertheless, the nature of those risks had evolved with change in the
financial markets157 and may not have been fully captured by VaR.158
Consolidation in the financial industry and higher levels of interdependency
across financial firms through, for example, greater reliance on short-term
interbank lending and derivatives trading,159 increased the likelihood that the
failure of one large firm would disrupt others.160 That risk was not reflected in
VaR. Competitive pressures also caused investment banks to enter new
business lines, sometimes recklessly.161 For example, investment banks moved
quickly into the mortgage securitization business, and in the process,
significantly increased their exposure to the risk of a downturn in the real
estate market162 and a slowdown in credit available to finance their mortgage
assets.163 Those risks were either new to investment banks or different in kind
from the risks they incurred before, raising the likelihood that they were also
not fully reflected in VaR.164
Finally, the investment banks increasingly relied on short-term sale and
repurchase (also known as “repo”) transactions in order to finance their
holdings.165 In a typical repo trade, a securities dealer (the “repo seller”) sells
securities to an investor (the “repo buyer”) for cash. The repo buyer’s
objective is not to invest in the securities; rather, the repo buyer expects to
receive a return from the repo seller for the use of the repo buyer’s cash.
Consequently, as part of the transaction, the repo seller also agrees with the
repo buyer to repurchase the same or equivalent securities at some future time.
The repurchase is frequently overnight at a price above the repo buyer’s
original purchase price.166 Economically, the trade is equivalent to a secured
loan—with the repo buyer lending cash to the repo seller against collateral that
157 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xx

(2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [http://perma.cc/6DU9H28N] (“The heavy debt taken on by some financial institutions was exacerbated by the
risky assets they were acquiring with that debt. As the mortgage and real estate markets
churned out riskier and riskier loans and securities, many financial institutions loaded up
on them.”).
158 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
159 See BIS REPORT, supra note 151, at 140.
160 See Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 71.
161 See supra notes 114–24 and accompanying text; see also Coffee Testimony, supra
note 92, at 62–63.
162 See Coffee Testimony, supra note 92, at 62.
163 See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 19, at 51–52.
164 See supra notes 114–24 and accompanying text; see also Coffee Testimony, supra
note 92, at 63 (“Their common goal was to assure themselves a continuing course of
supply of subprime mortgages to securitize, but in pursuit of this goal, both Merrill Lynch
and Lehman made risky acquisitions, in effect vertically integrating into the mortgage loan
origination field.”).
165 See Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 22
n.94 (2010).
166 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, A Repo Opera: How Criimi Mae Got Repos Backwards,
76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 565, 570–72 (2002).
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it discounts (a “haircut”) below market value.167 Using a simple example, if a
haircut is three percent, a firm can borrow $97 million for each $100 million
of collateral it pledges; the remaining $3 million must be financed using some
other source of capital.
Repo financing as a fraction of investment bank total assets grew
significantly after 1999, largely due to an increase in overnight repo which
roughly doubled from 2000 to 2007.168 The investment banks’ greater reliance
on overnight repo required them to roll-over a large portion of their funding
each day, exposing them to the risk of a shortfall in the event lenders refused
to re-extend credit the next day.169
Problems arose from the investment banks’ use of repo transactions to
fund their mortgage-related investments. Beginning in 2007, the value of those
assets began to drop as investors came to believe that loan quality had
eroded.170 As asset prices declined, lenders became unwilling to roll-over
existing or to extend new credit, or required the investment bank to post
additional collateral—tantamount, in any case, to depositors withdrawing
money from a bank.171 The result was a sudden drop in lending to the
investment banks172—equivalent to a “bank run,” but rather than a run by
depositors on a bank, it was a run by repo creditors on the investment
banks.173 In order to repay its lenders, each investment bank was forced to
quickly sell assets, often at discounted fire-sale prices, causing asset prices to

167 See Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic

of 2007, at 33–34 (May 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1401882.
168 See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–
2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 77, 80 (2009).
169 See id.
170 See Christian Laux & Christian Leuz, Did Fair-Value Accounting Contribute to the
Financial Crisis? 11 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 266, 2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1487905.
171 See Gorton, supra note 167, at 33–34; see also Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos,
Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1211, 1238 (2008)
(describing the “flight to collateral,” where investors sell assets that cannot be used as
collateral and buy assets that can be pledged to lenders at lower cost (emphasis omitted)).
172 See generally Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve,
Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium:
Reducing Systemic Risk (Aug. 22, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20080822a.htm [http://perma.cc/C9T6-D4CF].
173 See Gorton, supra note 167, at 31–38.
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drop further. The drop in value affected the price of similar assets held by
others, causing the firms’ balance sheet problems to be transmitted across the
market.174






Commercial banks were able to fully enter the capital markets following
passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act in 1999. The result—in large part
due to the banks’ sizeable balance sheets, their ability to use credit to win
investment bank mandates, and their push into traditional investment bank
services—was to cause investment banks to assume greater risk and higher
leverage in order to offset lost revenues, eventually precipitating the financial
crisis. Specifically:
1. Commercial banks used their balance sheets—their ability to extend
credit to potential clients—in order to win traditional investment bank
mandates, such as debt and equity underwriting.175 The restrictions on
tying were ineffective, largely due to the relaxed interpretation by
bank regulators.176
2. The greater competition and declining profits forced investment
banks into new business lines, increasing existing risks or creating
new ones.177
3. Aggregate risk also increased, consistent with growth in the
investment banks’ balance sheets and greater leverage,178 even
though, for most banks, relative risk (VaR/total assets) appears to have
remained roughly the same179 and risk also appears to have been
managed relative to the equity capital available to cover losses
(VaR/equity).180
4. Greater leverage and higher aggregate risk meant that the
investment banks had to be particularly accurate in their VaR
calculations. That was difficult to do in light of VaR’s reliance on
historical data and the relative newness of the businesses and risks to
174 See id. at 4–5, 31–35; see also Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity and

Financial Contagion, 11 FIN. STABILITY REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 2–3 (2008),
http://www.fednewyork.org/research/economist800drianan/Liquidity_Contagion_BdeF022
008.pdf [http://perma.cc/BU2X-MEJ4].
175 See supra notes 59–75 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 76–86 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 87–125 and accompanying text.
178 See supra Figures 1 & 3, notes 92–97, 108, 131–43 and accompanying text.
179 See supra Figure 2 and notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
180 See supra Figure 4 and notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
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which the investment banks were exposed.181 It was also possible that
the investment banks masked their risk exposure by manipulating VaR
to understate the new risks they assumed.182
5. Greater risk-taking and leverage among the investment banks were
significant factors leading to the meltdown in 2007,183 first evidenced
by Bear Stearns’ collapse184 and then by Lehman Brothers’ failure.185
In effect, as commercial banks began to capture greater amounts of
investment banking business, investment banks began to mimic commercial
bank operations. In some cases, they did so directly by building their own
commercial bank capabilities. Investment banks provided loans to private
wealth management186 and corporate clients,187 as well as allying with thirdparty commercial banks in order to extend credit.188 In other cases, they
increased their longer-term principal investments using short-term financing—
for banks, by balancing loans and deposits, and for investment banks, by
balancing loans and other principal investments that were financed using repo
and other short-term funding.189
The next Part addresses the regulatory divide—between commercial and
investment banking regulators—that enabled the greater risk-taking and
leverage among investment banks leading up to the financial crisis. At one
level, concerns over the regulatory divide may simply be of historical concern,
since the major investment banks are now all commercial banks.190 At a more
basic level, however, the story of what occurred after passage of the Gramm–
Leach–Bliley Act serves as a cautionary tale—what can happen when “siloed”
financial regulators, for legitimate reasons, pursue policy initiatives that spill
over to other parts of the market. It evidences an ongoing need for greater
181 See supra notes 114–25 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
184 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
185 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
186 See, e.g., Goldman Sachs 2007, supra note 66, at 48.
187 See McGeehan, supra note 66, at C1 (describing Merrill Lynch’s efforts to sweep

brokerage customer cash into the accounts of small banks it owned in order to lend to
corporate clients); see also Goldman Sachs 2004, supra note 93, at 14 (describing the
creation of the William Street subsidiaries to lend primarily to investment-grade clients);
Lehman 2003, supra note 90, at 7. Some banks managed the incremental credit risk
through, for example, loan syndication and derivatives. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley 2004,
supra note 63, at 28.
188 See Deals & Deal Makers: Bids & Offers, WALL STREET J., Jan. 31, 2003, at C4
(describing Goldman Sachs’s investment in Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group as
“increas[ing] the amount of credit Goldman can extend to its clients”).
189 See supra notes 162–63, 165–74 and infra notes 205–09 and accompanying text.
190 See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at A1 (noting that “the five biggest independent Wall Street firms
have all disappeared”); see also supra note 134.
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coordination among regulators in light of continued convergence—a breaking
down of “walls”—within the financial markets themselves.

III. SILOS AND WALLS
To this point, I have focused on changes in investment banking that
occurred following passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act. Those changes
were significant—a shift in market share, away from investment banks toward
commercial banks,191 with a resulting rise in risk-taking192 (in all likelihood,
inaccurately measured193) and leverage by the investment banks.194
What the changes suggest is that, as a competitive matter, it may be
difficult for commercial and investment banks to independently work side-byside even though (or, perhaps, because) both perform similar functions. In
general, financial intermediaries bridge the gap between suppliers and
consumers of capital. They collect capital from diverse investors and transfer it
to end-users at lower cost than the investors could do themselves.195 Those
financial intermediaries also act as informational middlemen, for example, by
conveying information about a consumer’s financial situation through changes
in stock price (in the capital markets)196 or using quasi-public information
about consumers, based on low-cost monitoring and long-term
relationships,197 to decide whether to invest and on what terms (in a
commercial bank).198
Commercial and investment banks also help smooth the transfer of capital.
Bank depositors typically can access money quickly, favoring short-term
191 See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 92–111 and accompanying text.
193 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
194 See supra notes 129–41 and accompanying text.
195 See Robert C. Merton, Operation and Regulation in Financial Intermediation: A

Functional Perspective, in OPERATION AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 17, 21–
27 (Peter Englund ed., 1993).
196 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1561–
63 (2007).
197 See Fischer Black, Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market, 2 J. FIN. ECON.
323, 323–24 (1975) (noting that the inefficiency of bank markets permits banks to
profitably exploit quasi-public information); George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The
Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1083–84
(1995) (attributing the monitoring advantage enjoyed by banks to special characteristics of
the bank sector, including the banks’ ability to cross-benchmark different borrowers and
press borrowers for more information).
198 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever
of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1212–13, 1219–23 (2006) (describing
the role of investors and covenants in the corporate decision-making of firms in financial
distress); Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51
REV. ECON. STUD. 393, 393–95 (1984) (introducing a model in which a financial
intermediary has a net cost advantage relative to direct lending).
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investments (bank deposits) that can be turned into cash on demand.
Borrowers, by contrast, require a source of longer-term capital (bank loans).199
One thing that makes banks special is their ability to balance the two—
managing a loan portfolio against the obligation to make depositors whole,
using loan proceeds to repay depositors, and compensating for any shortfall
with liquid reserves.200 Market-making provides a parallel function in the
capital markets.201 Many securities transactions involve a specialized financial
intermediary known as a “market-maker.” A market-maker trades securities as
principal on either side of the market—it is both a buyer and seller of the same
assets. If there are more buyers than sellers, or vice versa, the market-maker
must adjust its inventory in response to customer demand as well as change
the bid-ask prices in order to rebalance order flow.202 Like banks, marketmakers span the maturity gap between capital providers (who, as investors,
expect liquidity) and capital users (who require longer-term stability).203 Both
commercial and investment banks facilitate capital-raising by providing
investors with liquidity—the ability to raise cash quickly—without
interrupting the end-user’s longer-term employment of capital.204
There is, however, a significant difference between the two. Investment
banks typically fund themselves through short-term borrowing,205 such as
199 Term-loan maturities, for example, average sixty-nine months. See PHILIP E.
STRAHAN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., BORROWER RISK AND THE PRICE AND NONPRICE
TERMS OF BANK LOANS 25 tbl.1 (1999), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/
sr90.pdf [http://perma.cc/2X9Z-9CAG].
200 See Herring & Santomero, supra note 40, at 13–14.
201 See, e.g., THECITYUK, BOND MARKETS 2010, at 3 (2010) (noting that the U.S. bond
market lacks a central exchange and instead operates through hundreds of market-makers).
202 See Maureen O’Hara & George S. Oldfield, The Microeconomics of Market
Making, 21 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 361, 361 (1986).
203 See OLIVER WYMAN INC., THE VOLCKER RULE: CONSIDERATIONS FOR
IMPLEMENTATION
OF
PROPRIETARY
TRADING
REGULATIONS
9
(2011),
http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=22888 [http://perma.cc/FP4F-NKNK] (report
commissioned by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association).
204 See Thomas S. Y. Ho & Anthony Saunders, The Determinants of Bank Interest
Margins: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 16 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 582–
83 (1981) (noting that a major uncertainty that banks face relates to the demand for bank
loans and the supply of deposits—outflows and inflows, respectively—tending to follow
independent schedules); Hans R. Stoll, Alternative Views of Market Making, in MARKET
MAKING AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 67, 81–82 (Yakov
Amihud et al. eds., 1985) (noting that, from a functional standpoint, a market-maker’s
services mirror those provided by financial intermediaries, such as banks, since the marketmaker borrows short-term to finance long-term investments); see also Darrel Duffie, The
Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks 2 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper
No. 301, 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/work301.pdf [http://perma.cc/YRK96QKY] (describing depositors as individuals interested in short-term liquidity and
borrowers as individuals looking for longer-term finance, with banks acting as
intermediators).
205 See Adrian & Shin, supra note 129, at 7.
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overnight repo transactions.206 Commercial banks also rely on short-term
borrowing, but a substantial portion of their funding comes from deposits,207
which are relatively stable in light of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) support,208 as well as longer-term borrowing.209 Consequently, in the
ordinary course, a commercial bank’s ability to grow its balance sheet—its
ability to make loans and other investments—is likely to be less volatile and
less affected by change in capital markets conditions than an investment
bank.210 This access to stable, low-cost funding provided commercial banks
with a substantial competitive advantage over their investment bank rivals—
and so, as one might expect, commercial banks made substantial inroads into
the traditional investment bank business.211
But at what cost? It is too early to fully assess the impact of those changes,
but it is fair to say, even if the financial crisis had not occurred, that the effects
of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act on the capital markets would have been
substantial. For example, a principal goal of bank regulation has been to
prevent individual banks from obtaining substantial economic power outside
the financial markets, in particular, through control over non-financial
businesses.212 Passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act permitted banks to
enter new business lines. Among those businesses, commercial banks began to
206 See supra notes 165–74 and accompanying text.
207 See Kevin Buehler et al., Between Deluge and Drought: The Future of US Bank

Liquidity and Funding 1 (McKinsey & Co., Working Paper on Risk No. 48, 2013) (noting
that, for banks, deposits constitute forty-nine percent of liabilities, repo financing has
declined, and debt maturity has increased); see also Adrian & Shin, supra note 129, at 7.
208 See Whitehead, supra note 165, at 14 (noting that, in response to the financial
crisis, the maximum insurable amount for each deposit account was raised from $100,000
to $250,000). Banks can also access Federal Reserve funds to temporarily cover shortfalls
in liquidity in the event of substantial withdrawals. See Mark E. Van Der Weide & Satish
M. Kini, Subordinated Debt: A Capital Markets Approach to Bank Regulation, 41 B.C. L.
REV. 195, 204–05 (2000). More recently, in light of the financial crisis, some of the
nation’s largest securities firms (including Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) elected to
become bank holding companies subject to federal bank regulation. Among other benefits,
those firms can now access funding that has historically been made available by the
Federal Reserve to commercial banks. See Patrice Hill, Treasury to Try to Keep Owners in
Their Homes; Goldman, Morgan Cleared to Acquire Banks, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008,
at A1.
209 See Buehler et al., supra note 207, at 1.
210 See TOBIAS ADRIAN & HYUN SONG SHIN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARIES AND MONETARY ECONOMICS 24 (2010), http://www.fednewyork.org/
research/staff_reports/sr398.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5F62-MYGY]
(“Market-based
intermediaries[, like investment banks,] who fund themselves through short-term
borrowing such as commercial paper or repurchase agreements will be sensitively affected
by market conditions. But for a commercial bank, its large balance sheet masks the effects
operating at the margin.”).
211 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
212 See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 10, 16–17 (1991) (examining commercial bank regulation using public choice
theory).
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buy and sell physical commodities—in some cases, requiring them to take
ownership and delivery of the commodity itself.213 The result was a
concentration of power within, and the assumption of new risks by,
commercial banks.214 It also raised the risk of a change in the commodities
markets themselves—with banks using their financial strength to influence
non-bank participants and, potentially, changing the way in which the
commodities markets function.215
In addition, commercial and investment banks had competed with each
other for decades before passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act. Many
capital markets innovations were driven by that competition as investment
banks searched for new ways to replicate bank functions through the capital
markets.216 With growing consolidation,217 it is less clear that the capital
markets would have continued to innovate at the same pace as before.218
Moreover, with consolidation, there is a risk of less liquidity in the capital
markets. Fewer participants may mean there are fewer entities to buy and sell

213 In 2003, for example, following its acquisition of Salomon Brothers, Citigroup

became the first bank holding company to obtain bank regulatory approval of its
commodity-trading unit’s buying and selling of physical commodities. That approval
included trading in commodities on the spot market, as well as taking and making physical
delivery of commodities to settle commodity derivatives. See Dietrich Domanski &
Alexandra Heath, Financial Investors and Commodity Markets, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2007, at
53, 65–66, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1600058 (describing the rise of financial investors in
the commodities market). Banks had traded commodity derivatives since the 1980s, but,
following passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, they began to trade in the underlying
physical commodities as an activity that was “complementary” to their derivatives
business. See Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and
Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 293–94, 297–307 (2014) (describing the growth of
bank trading in commodities).
214 See id. at 269–71.
215 See id. at 346–48, 355.
216 See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text.
217 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
218 See WILLIAM C. DUDLEY & R. GLENN HUBBARD, GLOBAL MKTS. INST. GOLDMAN
S ACHS , HOW CAPITAL M ARKETS E NHANCE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND
FACILITATE JOB CREATION 6 (2004), https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/
ghubbard/Articles%20for%20Web%20Site/How%20Capital%20Markets%20Enhance%20
Economic%20Performance%20and%20Facilit.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y37Z-W7T4] (“Such
[consolidated] systems may have stifled the incentives to develop capital market substitutes
for depository institution intermediation.”).
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securities.219 It may also mean a decline in the number of venues through
which small, start-up companies can access the public capital markets.220
Finally, even before commercial banks entered the capital markets,
investment banks faced conflicts of interest as underwriters, on the one hand,
and as research analysts, brokers, and asset managers, on the other.221
Combining commercial and investment banks is likely to have raised new
conflicts. Perhaps the best example is the recent London Interbank Offered
Rate (LIBOR) scandal. LIBOR is a benchmark interest rate—used as a
reference for $300 trillion in loans, derivatives, and other financial products—
that is derived from the rates that major banks charge each other for loans in
the London interbank market.222 Barclays, a U.K. bank, and fifteen other
financial institutions, including J.P. Morgan and Citigroup, have been fined or
are being investigated for manipulating LIBOR between 2005 and 2008.223
Among the allegations, traders at several banks are accused of conspiring to
influence LIBOR by causing commercial bank colleagues to submit rates that
were higher or lower than the rates the bank would actually pay.224 Doing so
permitted the traders to profit on derivatives whose value was tied to
LIBOR—meaning that, rather than reflecting a bank’s actual borrowing rates,
LIBOR began to reflect the traders’ derivatives positions.225
Of course, it is possible that some or all of those changes would have
arisen even without passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act. But I am
skeptical, largely because they arose or became more acute as a result of
consolidation in the financial markets—an outcome of the collapse of the wall
219 See Luigi Zingales, Why I Was Won Over by Glass–Steagall, FIN. TIMES (June 10,

2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cb3e52be-b08d-11e1-8b36-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3
FIOoPKRZ [http://perma.cc/CE24-WJ3V] (“I realised it was not simply coincidence that
we witnessed a prospering of securities markets and the blossoming of new ones (options
and futures markets) while Glass–Steagall was in place, but since its repeal have seen a
demise of public equity markets and an explosion of opaque over-the-counter ones.”).
220 See DAVID WEILD & EDWARD KIM, GRANT THORNTON, MARKET STRUCTURE IS
CAUSING THE IPO CRISIS—AND MORE 15 (2010), http://www.grantthornton.com/
staticfiles/GTCom/Public%20companies%20and%20capital%20markets/Files/IPO%20cris
is%20-%20June%202010%20-%20FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/5B3H-SNCD] (stating that
the investment banks that had supported the IPO market had not survived, and “[f]irms
[that] have attempted to fill the void . . . have found that the economic model . . . no longer
works”).
221 See Papaioannou, supra note 64, at 99.
222 John Kiff, What is LIBOR?, 49 FIN. & DEV. 32, 32 (2012), http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/12/basics.htm [http://perma.cc/NRW8-FMFW].
223 James McBride et al., Understanding the Libor Scandal, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL.,
http://www.cfr.org/united-kingdom/understanding-libor-scandal/p28729 [http://perma.cc/
439S-QB8W] (last updated May 21, 2015).
224 See Libor—What is It and Why does It Matter?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 18, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/ business-19199683 [http://perma.cc/Y9D5-K89F].
225 Harry Wilson, Barclays Fund ‘Lowered’ Libor for Profit—Court Papers,
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/libor-scandal/10379316
/Barclays-fund-lowered-Libor-for-profit-court-papers.html [http://perma.cc/TVK7-5UJH].

2015]

SIZE MATTERS

807

separating commercial banks from other businesses following the Gramm–
Leach–Bliley Act’s passage.226 More to the point, they all arose from changes
in bank regulation that affect the capital markets. The bank regulators’
principal focus was on commercial bank stability and, to that end, improving
bank profitability, as well as diversifying sources of revenue.227 Prior to the
2007 financial crisis,228 those regulators were not charged with overseeing
investment banks,229 nor did they have access to investment bank information
in order to do so.230 As a result, when relaxing the Glass–Steagall Act’s
restrictions231 and, later, when analyzing the anti-tying prohibitions,232 the
bank regulators focused on commercial bank stability, not on the potential for
changes in regulation to negatively affect non-banks and the capital markets.
Even today, the regulators continue to operate within separate silos—the
principal capital markets regulators are the SEC and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, and the principal commercial bank regulators are the
Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.233
One solution may simply be to reinstate the Glass–Steagall Act. There
certainly are advocates to do so, perhaps most notably a bipartisan
Congressional proposal in 2013.234 It is less certain whether the banks’

226 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
228 Recall that, today, the largest investment banks are no longer independent

companies or have become bank holding companies subject to Federal Reserve oversight.
See supra note 134.
229 See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Requiem for the Bulge Bracket?: Revisiting Investment
Bank Regulation, 85 IND. L.J. 777, 782–84 (2010).
230 The SEC failed to acquire that information as well. See Labaton, supra note 140, at
A1 (quoting former SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid, “In retrospect, the tragedy is
that . . . [the SEC had] the ability to get information that would have been critical to
sensible monitoring, and yet the S.E.C. didn’t oversee well enough . . . .”).
231 See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 76–86 and accompanying text.
233 The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), created in July 2010, provides
for some coordination among financial regulators. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012). Its principal charge is to
identify risks to U.S. financial stability arising from activities in or outside the financial
markets. See 12 U.S.C. § 5322. The FSOC must “identify gaps in regulation that could
pose risks to” U.S. financial stability, § 5322(a)(2)(G), as well as make recommendations
to primary regulators to “apply new or heightened standards and safeguards for financial
activities or practices that could create or increase risks” among financial firms and
markets, § 5322(a)(2)(K). The Council is chaired by the Treasury Secretary and is
comprised of ten voting members and five non-voting members. See § 5321(b)(1).
234 See S. 1282, 113th Cong. (2013) (“To reduce risks to the financial system by
limiting banks’ ability to engage in certain risky activities and limiting conflicts of interest,
to reinstate certain Glass–Steagall Act protections that were repealed by the Gramm–
Leach–Bliley Act, and for other purposes.”); H.R. 3711, 113th Cong. (2013) (same).
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regulators would favor a return to the Glass–Steagall era,235 in particular in
light of the pressures that caused deregulation in the first place.236 As I have
argued elsewhere,237 fixed barriers like those in the Glass–Steagall Act may
simply be fixtures of the past—a financial Maginot Line238 within an evolving
financial system.239 This is particularly true to the extent new products fall
outside the bounds of established regulation. Innovation may require more
flexible regulation240 and more flexibility among regulators to the extent a new
product or service is not squarely within the responsibility of any one
agency.241
The response may be to create a single regulator that is responsible for the
financial markets as a whole, rather than a particular function or segment.242
Such a regulator could balance the costs and benefits of regulatory change
across the marketplace, without the “pushmi-pullyu”243 tension that
characterized commercial and investment bank regulation before and after
235 See Carter Dougherty & Cheyenne Hopkins, Warren Joins McCain to Push New

Glass–Steagall Law for Banks, BLOOMBERG (July 12, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-07-11/warren-joins-mccain-to-push-new-Glass-Steagall-bill-for-banks.html [http://
perma.cc/HJV2-75T6] (quoting Senator Warren, a co-sponsor of the Senate bill, as saying
to regulators, “Based on what the regulators did to Glass–Steagall over the last 30 years, I
don’t expect anyone on this panel will jump and endorse the new Glass–Steagall
bill . . . .”).
236 See supra notes 38–53 and accompanying text.
237 See Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets, 1
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 43–44 (2011) (querying whether the Volcker Rule properly reflects
change in the financial markets).
238 The Maginot Line was a line of fortifications and other defenses that France
constructed along its borders with Germany during the period before World War II. The
fortification was based on the success of static, defensive combat in World War I and was
intended to provide time for the French army to mobilize in the event of attack. It
ultimately proved to be ineffective in World War II, as motorized elements of the German
army were able to flank the Maginot Line and proceed directly into France. See Irving M.
Gibson, The Maginot Line, 17 J. MOD. HIST. 130, 141–46 (1945).
239 See Whitehead, supra note 165, at 2–5 (describing broad changes in the financial
markets, relating to market participants and financial instruments); see also supra notes
39–49 and accompanying text.
240 See Russell J. Funk & Daniel Hirschman, Derivatives and Deregulation: Financial
Innovation and the Demise of Glass–Steagall 8 (Jan. 4, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2374496.
241 See id. at 9.
242 See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury
Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 726 (2009) (moving to a central regulator
proceeds “on the premise that, as the lines between banks, securities dealers, and insurers
blur, so regulators should similarly converge. That idea should remain at the heart of the
U.S. debate . . . .”).
243 Readers of The Story of Doctor Dolittle will recall that the pushmi-pullyu
(pronounced “push-me—pull-you”) was a gazelle-unicorn cross that had two heads, one
each at opposite ends of its body. When it tried to move, each head tried to go in the
opposite direction. See HUGH LOFTING, THE STORY OF DOCTOR DOLITTLE 68 (1997).

2015]

SIZE MATTERS

809

passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act. Commercial bank regulators would
no longer pursue siloed policies that, as this Article has illustrated,244 had the
effect of increasing investment bank risk-taking and leverage, in turn, spilling
over to the commercial banks themselves.245
The concern is more than historical, notwithstanding more recent
consolidation among commercial and investment banks.246 Consider, for
example, the relationship between hedge funds, regulated by the SEC, and
commercial bank holding companies, regulated by the Federal Reserve.
Dislocation in one industry is likely to create problems in the other,247 with
aggregate bank returns to date appearing to have had a more significant impact
on hedge funds rather than vice versa.248 Part of the effect may be due to
banks engaging in proprietary trading that previously competed with hedge
funds.249 Another part may result from banks providing fee-based services to
hedge funds that declined when the hedge fund industry slowed.250 A third
part may be the ability of banks to transfer credit risk to hedge fund managers,
who can then trade that risk with other market participants.251 The result, in
244 See supra Parts II.B. and C.
245 Note that the Dodd–Frank Act authorizes the FSOC, with the vote of seven of its

ten members, to designate systemically important non-bank financial institutions (SIFIs)
for heightened regulation by the Federal Reserve Board. Firms are included “if the Council
determines that material financial distress . . . or the nature, scope, size, scale,
concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the [firm’s] activities . . . could pose a threat
to the financial stability of the United States.” 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012); see also Authority
to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 76 Fed.
Reg. 4555, 4559–60 (Jan. 26, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310) (describing proposed
criteria to be used in determining whether to subject a nonbank financial firm to Federal
Reserve Board supervision and standards). Consequently, it is possible today for a SIFI to
fall under a single regulator. Of course, not all entities are SIFIs, nor does the new
requirement extend to industry-wide risks that may result from new or amended regulation.
SIFI-based regulation, for example, would not address the industry-wide conflicts that may
have caused the LIBOR scandal. See supra notes 221–25 and accompanying text. The
FSOC is also charged with “identify[ing] gaps in regulation that could pose risks to” U.S.
financial stability, 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2)(G) (2012), as well as making recommendations
to primary regulators to “apply new or heightened standards and safeguards for financial
activities or practices that could create or increase risks” among financial firms and
markets, § 5322(a)(2)(K). If used, those provisions could provide a basis for additional
coordination among regulators.
246 See supra notes 134, 190 and accompanying text.
247 See Nicholas Chan et al., Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds, in THE RISKS OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 235, 318, 326 (Mark Carey & René M. Stulz eds., 2006).
248 See Monica Billio et al., Econometric Measures of Systemic Risk in the Finance
and Insurance Sectors 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16223, July
2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16223 [http://perma.cc/Y6LP-44U4] (noting that
financial innovation, like securitization, and the emergence of new business relationships
between banks and hedge funds have resulted in a closer interrelationship between them).
249 See Chan et al., supra note 247, at 309; Billio et al., supra note 248, at 3.
250 See Chan et al., supra note 247, at 309.
251 See Whitehead, supra note 237, at 45–46.
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any case, is the potential for a downturn among commercial banks if there is a
disruption in the hedge fund industry, and vice versa.252 Commercial banks are
largely prohibited from entering the hedge fund business by Section 619 of the
Dodd–Frank Act, commonly known as the “Volcker Rule.” That Rule
prohibits a banking entity253 from “engag[ing] in proprietary trading” or
“acquir[ing] or retain[ing] any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest
in or sponsor[ing] a hedge fund or private equity fund,”254 subject to certain
exceptions.255 As with the Glass–Steagall Act, the concern is whether change
in the Volcker Rule, subject to oversight by one regulator, will affect markets
and institutions subject to oversight by another. Experience to date suggests
those changes are likely to occur.256 To the extent they do, recent history tells
252 There is, in fact, a real risk of industry-wide slowdown among hedge funds. Recent
evidence suggests that, under some circumstances, hedge funds may perform in the same
way, irrespective of management style, causing an overall decline in hedge fund
performance at the same time. See Tomas Garbaravicius & Frank Dierick, Hedge Funds
and Their Implications for Financial Stability 43–45 (European Cent. Bank, Working
Paper No. 34, Aug. 2005), http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp34.pdf [http://
perma.cc/RKF6-J7G9]. To be sure, the Dodd–Frank Act expanded hedge fund regulation
by, among other things, eliminating the private adviser exemption from the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 and, with certain exceptions, requiring private fund advisers to
register with the SEC. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§ 403, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2012); see also Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital
Funds, Private Fund Advisers With Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management,
and Foreign Private Advisers, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,190 (Dec. 10, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 275); Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 75
Fed. Reg. 77,052 (Dec. 10, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279). As a practical
matter, however, the new requirements are likely to do little to affect the hedge fund
industry, since about seventy percent of hedge fund assets were ostensibly managed by
advisers that had voluntarily registered with the SEC. See After Dodging Many Bullets,
Hedge Funds Are Back in Regulators’ Sights, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Mar. 18, 2009),
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2185 [http://perma.cc/CA6AA3AW] (noting that many hedge funds were willing to voluntarily register with the SEC in
order to attract institutional investor funds). Moreover, based on current resources, the SEC
has estimated it will not be able to audit a registered investment adviser more than once in
every eleven years. See DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, STUDY ON ENHANCING INVESTMENT
ADVISER EXAMINATIONS 14 (2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/914studyfinal.pdf
[http://perma.cc/M5HA-ZF89].
253 “Banking entity” is defined in section 13(h)(1) of the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956 (BHA), as amended by section 619 of the Dodd–Frank Act. 12 U.S.C. §1851
(2012). The term includes any insured depository institution (other than certain limited
purpose trust institutions), any company that controls an insured depository institution, any
company that is treated as a bank holding company for purposes of section 8 of the
International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3106 (2012), and any affiliate of any of the
foregoing.
254 Dodd–Frank Act § 619 (amending the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12
U.S.C. § 1851 (2012)).
255 See Whitehead, supra note 237, at 40. The Rule also limits similar activities by
certain systemically important non-bank financial institutions. See id.
256 See supra notes 235–41 and accompanying text.
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us that the ability of regulators to assess the effect of those changes across the
financial markets is imperative, but also imperfect.

IV. CONCLUSION
In Rashomon, a film directed by Akira Kurosawa, four characters relate
their (sometimes self-serving) account of a horrific crime and what may or
may not have taken place.257 The film is perhaps best-known for a plot device
involving characters who provide alternative and often contradictory versions
of the same incident.
One might recall Rashomon when assessing the conventional story around
financial regulatory reform and the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act. That story
offers an account based on the relationship between the Act and greater risktaking by commercial banks, resulting in (or fueling) the 2007 financial crisis.
No doubt, passage of the Act prompted change in how banks conducted
business, including new or additional risks beyond those the banks
traditionally encountered. But another version of the story is set out in this
Article. Here, the focus has been on the effect of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley
Act on the capital markets and investment banks. That effect was a
consequence of policies that failed to consider the risk-taking and leverage that
would result as commercial banks diversified their revenue sources.
This Article’s account is a critical part of the story, because the effects are
ongoing. And, very likely, the story will be repeated when existing
regulation—much like what occurred around the Glass–Steagall Act—is
modified to reflect future change in the marketplace. Acknowledging the role
that bank regulation (and de-regulation) played in reshaping the capital
markets and its participants is a key step in the right direction.

257 See RASHOMON (Daiei Motion Picture Company 1950).

